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Abstract	

Relational thinking plays a central role in human cognition.  However, we do not know how children and adults ac-
quire relational concepts and come to represent them in a form that is useful for the purposes of relational thinking 
(i.e., as structures that can be dynamically bound to arguments).  The authors present a theory of how a psychologi-
cally and neurally plausible cognitive architecture can discover relational concepts from examples and represent 
them as explicit structures (predicates) that can take arguments (i.e., predicate them).  The theory is instantiated as a 
computer program called DORA (Discovery Of Relations by Analogy).  DORA is used to simulate the discovery of 
novel properties and relations, as well as a body of empirical phenomena from the domain of relational learning and 
the development of relational representations in children and adults.   !
Keywords: Learning relations, learning structured representations, relation discovery, cognitive devel-
opment, analogy.   !
Relational thinking—thinking that is constrained by 
the relational roles things play, rather than just the literal 
features of those things—is a cornerstone of human 
perception and cognition.  It underlies our ability to 
comprehend visual scenes (Biederman, 1987, Green & 
Hummel, 2004), learn and use rules (Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998; Lovett & Anderson, 2005), appreciate 
analogies between different situations or knowledge 
systems (Gentner, 1983, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 
1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995), understand and pro-
duce language, science, art, and mathematics, and even 
our ability to appreciate basic perceptual similarities 
(Medin, Goldstone & Gentner, 1993).  The ability to 
appreciate and use relations also underlies the transition 
from similarity-based to structure-based cognition in 
children (e.g., Gentner, 2003; Gentner & Rattermann, 
1991; Halford, 2005).   
In order to think about a relation, it is necessary to 
represent it as an explicit entity (i.e., a predicate) that 
can take novel arguments.  Doing so entails solving 
three more basic problems (Doumas & Hummel, 2005; 
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003).  First, it is necessary 
to have a representational element (e.g., a symbol, 
node[s] in a network, or neuron[s] in a brain) that corre-
sponds specifically to the relation (or, more accurately, 
to the roles of the relation, as elaborated shortly), be-
cause in order to appreciate what one instance of a rela-
tion has in common with another, the two situations 
must have something in common (specifically, the rep-
resentational elements corresponding to the roles of the 
relation; Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 1997).   
Second, it is necessary to specify the bindings of 
relational roles to their arguments.  Together the first 
and second requirements imply that the bindings of 
roles to their fillers must be dynamic (Hummel & Bie-
derman, 1990, 1992; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Shastri 
& Ajjenagadde, 1993).  That is, it must be possible to 
create and destroy bindings on the fly, and the mecha-
nism or tag that represents the bindings must be inde-
pendent of the elements that represent the roles and 
fillers so bound.  For example, in order to understand 
how a cone above a brick is similar to and differs from a 
brick above a cone, one must simultaneously appreciate 
that the same elements are involved in the same relation 
in both cases, and that, while in one case the brick is 
bound to the higher role and the cone to the lower role, 
in the other case these role bindings are reversed.   
Finally, these representational elements—and the 
concepts they represent—must come from someplace. 
In particular, unless all relational concepts (e.g., above, 
causes, chases, loves, larger-than, ameliorates, etc.) are 
assumed to be innate, they must somehow be learned 
from examples. Although numerous cognitive and per-
ceptual models postulate elements corresponding specif-
ically to relations (e.g., Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; 
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Falkenhainer, Forbus & Gentner, 1989) or relational 
roles (Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 1997, 2003; Shastri & Ajjenagadde, 1993), 
and all of these models specify methods for binding 
relational roles to their arguments, to date no model has 
provided a satisfactory account of how we learn rela-
tional concepts from examples (although for efforts in 
this direction, see Gasser & Colunga, 2001, 2003).   
Accounting for how we learn and predicate relation-
al concepts is difficult, in part, because of the require-
ment that the same element(s) must represent a given 
relation regardless of what its arguments happen to be at 
the time.  Ideally, a relation (such as above) must be 
represented in a way that is completely agnostic with 
respect to its potential arguments (so that it can be rep-
resented in the same way regardless of what is above 
what).  However, any specific example of a relation is 
always instantiated with some specific set of arguments 
(e.g., in order to have an example of above, some spe-
cific thing must be above some other specific thing).  It 
is never possible to observe an example of pure, disem-
bodied “aboveness”.  As such, it is not obvious how the 
cognitive architecture might learn to represent “above-
ness” in a way that is argument free.  Our goal in this 
paper is to present a theory of how the human cognitive 
architecture solves this problem of learning and repre-
senting novel relational concepts. !
The Development of Relational Thought	

An important theme that has emerged in the study of 
relational thinking is that the ability to reason relational-
ly changes with development (e.g., Gentner & Ratter-
mann, 1991; Halford, 2005).  Across a variety of tasks 
and procedures children initially make inferences based 
on whole-object similarity and gradually acquire the 
ability to make inferences based on the relational roles 
to which objects are bound (e.g., Gentner, 1977; 1988; 
2003; Gentner & Rattermann, 1991; Gentner & Namy, 
1999; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Goswami, 1992; Hal-
ford, 1980; Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996; Richland, Mor-
rison, & Holyoak, 2006, Smith, 1984, 1989).  For ex-
ample, given a picture of a dog chasing a cat and anoth-
er picture of a boy chasing a girl with a cat in the back-
ground, 3 year-old children tend to match the cat in the 
first picture to the cat in the second picture (based on 
their featural similarity), whereas 5 year-old children 
tend to match the cat in the first picture to the girl in the 
second picture based on their relational similarity (both 
are being chased; e.g., Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 
2006).  Gentner and Rattermann (1991) refer to this 
developmental trend as the relational shift.   
Traditional connectionist models based on dis-
tributed representations (e.g., Colunga & Smith, 2005) 
provide a good account of younger children’s reasoning 
based on whole-object similarity.  However, these sys-
tems cannot account for later relational thought (see 
Holyoak & Hummel, 2000; St. John, 1992).  On the 
other hand, systems based on structured representations 
(e.g., Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Falkenhainer et al., 
1989; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003) provide a good 
account of older children’s and adult’s reasoning based 
on relations, but provide no account of where the struc-
tured representations on which they rely come from in 
the first place.  That is, although we can account for the 
behavior of both younger and older children on relation-
al tasks, we cannot account for how the ability to reason 
relationally develops because we do not know how the 
kinds of representations that support relational thought 
are learned from the kinds of representations that sup-
port whole-object similarity-based reasoning.   
That we lack an account of how people do—or even 
could—learn structured representations from unstruc-
tured examples is often cited as the most significant 
limitation of structure-based accounts of cognition (e.g., 
Munakata & O’Reilly, 2003; O’Reilly & Busby, 2002; 
O’Reilly, Busby, & Soto, 2003).  As such, an under-
standing of how we learn structured relational concepts 
from unstructured inputs will not only contribute to our 
understanding of the development of relational thinking 
and the foundations of symbolic thought in general (see 
Smith, 1989), but will also address a fundamental limi-
tation of current structure-based accounts of cognition.   !
The Purpose of the Current Work	

Discovering a relation and representing it in a form 
that can support relational thinking entails solving three 
problems.  First, there must be some basic featural in-
variants that remain constant across instances of the 
relation, and the perceptual/cognitive system must be 
able to detect them.  Second, the architecture must be 
able to isolate these invariants from the other properties 
of the objects engaged in the relation to be learned.  And 
third, it must be able to predicate the relational proper-
ties—that is, represent them as explicit entities that can 
be bound to arbitrary, novel arguments. !
Detecting Featural and Relational Invariants 
The most basic prerequisite to explicitly relational 
thought is the capacity to detect relational (and feature-
al) invariants in the environment. For example, to learn 
the above relation, the cognitive architecture must be 
able to detect the invariant perceptual properties present 
when one object is above another regardless of the na-
ture of the objects involved.  There is ample evidence 
that children possess at least primitive versions of these 
features from even a very young age. 
For example, Clearfield and Mix (1999) and Feigen-
son, Carey, and Spelke (2002) have shown that even 
infants as young as six-months are sensitive to differ-
ences such as “more” or “less” in properties like size 
and surface area.  Similarly, Baillergeon and her col-
leagues have shown that very young children have an 
intuitive understanding of basic relational concepts such 
as occludes, contains, collides-with and supports (for a 
summary, see Baillergeon, 2004).  These findings sug-
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gest that the mechanisms for detecting these invariants 
are present in the visual system at a very early age.   
In addition, some models have made progress 
demonstrating how basic visual invariants can be de-
tected from early visual representations.  For example, 
Hummel and Biederman (1992) describe a model that 
computes abstract invariant features, including relation-
al features, from holistic visual representations very 
much like those in visual area V1 (see also Hummel, 
2001; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996).  In addition, 
Kellman, Burke and Hummel (1999) describe a model 
that can learn visual invariants from similarly V1-like 
inputs.  Together, these models suggest solutions to the 
problem of detecting invariant relational features.   
The findings and models summarized here do not 
provide a complete answer to the question of where 
relational invariants come from; important aspects of 
this problem remain largely unsolved.  But this work 
demonstrates, minimally, that children—even very 
young children—can detect featural and relational in-
variants in the world and that such invariants can be 
computed from early (non-invariant) visual representa-
tions. 
However, being able to detect relational invariants 
(i.e., solving the first problem) is not the same as being 
able to isolate them from other features and represent 
them as explicit structures that can take arguments 
(solving the second and third).  Simply having relational 
“features” provides no basis for binding those relations 
to their arguments.  It is for this reason that simply de-
claring that various nodes in a neural network represent 
“relations” does not render the network’s representa-
tions relational (see Doumas & Hummel, 2005; Halford 
et al., 1998; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003).  What 
makes a representation relational is not the population 
of features it contains, but the capacity to compose those 
features into structures that permit dynamic binding of 
relational roles to their arguments.  Thus, although it 
may appear at first blush that the difficulty of learning 
relational concepts lies in discovering their constituent 
“features”, in fact, the ability to compose those features 
into relational structures is what distinguishes a rela-
tional representation from a non-relational one.   !
Isolating and Predicating Object Properties and Rela-
tions 
In the real world, relational invariants never appear 
in isolation.  For example, every observable instance of 
the above relation consists of some specific object 
above some other specific object.  In spite of this, we 
somehow learn to represent above in a way that remains 
the same regardless of the arguments to which it is 
bound.  In order to learn an explicit representation of a 
relational concept such as above, the cognitive architec-
ture must be able to isolate the relevant relational in-
variants from the other properties of the objects engaged 
in the relation (e.g., the specific shapes of those 
objects).  
In addition, the cognitive architecture must be able 
to predicate the relational properties (i.e., represent 
them as explicit entities that can be bound to arbitrary, 
novel arguments; Doumas & Hummel, 2005; Gentner 
1983, 1989, 2003; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Halford 
et al., 1998; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003; Mark-
man, 1999).  For example, predicating the relation 
above entails learning a representation of above that is 
independent of its arguments, and explicitly and dynam-
ically codes the binding of these arguments to their rela-
tional roles (i.e., specifies which is above which).  It is 
this last step that marks the transition from a feature-
based representation to a genuinely relational or struc-
tured one (Doumas & Hummel, 2005; Halford, 1998; 
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).  As such, the difficulty of 
learning relational representations lies not in learning 
their content (e.g., what above “means”) but in learning 
their format (i.e., coming to represent them in a way that 
allows them to bind to novel arguments).   
This paper presents a theory of how the human cog-
nitive architecture solves the problems of isolating rela-
tional invariants and representing them as explicit struc-
tures that can take arguments.  The result is a theory of 
how structured relational representations can be learned 
from unstructured examples—that is, of how relational 
thought can be bootstrapped from non-relational begin-
nings. 
We begin by discussing a set of representational and 
processing constraints that make the problem of learn-
ing structured representations of relational concepts 
tractable. We then describe a theory of the discovery and 
predication of relational concepts based on these con-
straints.  The theory is instantiated in a computer model 
called DORA (Discovery Of Relations by Analogy), 
which we have constrained to be both cognitively and 
neurally plausible (e.g., it works within intrinsic WM 
capacity limits, and both its knowledge representations 
and the operations on those representations are designed 
to have a transparent neural analog).  We demonstrate 
the sufficiency of the model by using it to simulate (a) 
the discovery and predication of novel object properties 
and relations, (b) a body of empirical phenomena from 
the domain of relational learning and (c) the develop-
ment of relational representations in children and adults. 
Finally, we discuss the implications and limitations of 
the model and suggest directions for future research. !
Constraints on Relation Discovery	

Knowledge Representation 
One step toward constraining the problem of relation 
discovery and predication is to choose an appropriate 
form of knowledge representation.  Formally, any multi-
place predicate can be recast as a collection of single-
place predicates (one for each role of the relation), with 
functions for linking them (Mints, 2001).  Such repre-
sentations are known as role-filler bindings.  For exam-
ple, the role-filler binding representation of above (ball, 
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table) would consist of a representation of the higher 
role bound to ball (higher (ball)) and the lower role 
bound to table (lower (table)) linked together to form 
the structure higher (ball)&lower (table) (where & is the 
linking function; see, e.g., Doumas & Hummel, 2004a, 
2005).   
Role-filler binding provides a natural constraint on 
the problem of relation discovery because it reduces the 
problem of learning relations to the problem of learning 
single-place predicates (i.e., properties or roles) and 
then linking them together to form complete relational 
structures.  This approach allows us to recast the ques-
tion “How do we discover and predicate relational struc-
tures from examples?” as two simpler questions:  “How 
do we learn single-place predicates (such as object 
properties)?” and “How do we link them together to 
form multi-place relations?”   !
The Role of Mapping and Comparison 
An important theme that has emerged in the litera-
ture on relational reasoning is that analogical map-
ping—the processes of discovering which elements of 
one system of knowledge correspond to which elements 
of another based on their shared relations—and the re-
lated process of comparison play a central role in all 
forms of relational reasoning (see Gentner, 1983, 2003; 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995).  For example, mapping 
bootstraps the induction of abstract relational schemas 
(e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Ratterman & Gentner, 
1998; Sandhofer & Smith, 2001), and comparison as-
sists in early category learning (e.g., Fisher & Sloutsky, 
2005; Gentner & Medina, 1998; Gentner & Namy, 
1999; Namy & Gentner, 2002; Namy, Smith, and Ger-
shkoff-Stowe, 1997; Oakes & Madole, 2003), helps 
people appreciate which known relations might be rele-
vant to a specific task (e.g., Bowdle & Gentner, 1997; 
Dixon & Bangart, 2004; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Ko-
tovsky & Gentner, 1996; Kurtz & Burkina, 2004; 
Markman & Gentner, 1993; Ross, Perkins, & Tenpenny, 
1990; Spalding & Ross, 1994; Yamauchi & Markman, 
1998, 2000), and aids in the discovery and predication 
of novel higher-order relations from known lower-order 
relations (Doumas & Hummel, 2004b). 
Gentner (1983, 2003) and Mandler (1988, 1992, 
2004) suggest that comparison plays a role in the dis-
covery of new relations by highlighting the shared prop-
erties of objects.  Similarly, we hypothesize that com-
parison may bootstrap the discovery of relations by 
leading to the discovery of shared properties, which can 
be linked together to form the roles of new relations. 
The general idea is that, during comparison, properties 
that objects share become more active than properties 
unique to one object or the other, thus highlighting the 
shared (invariant) properties and setting the stage for 
their becoming represented as explicit predicates. 
As a simplified example, consider a child learning a 
property like “big” by comparing a truck to an elephant 
(Figure 1a).  A key theoretical claim is that when objects 
are compared, features they share receive input from 
both objects (i.e., because they are connected to both), 
whereas features unique to one object or the other re-
ceive input from only one object or the other.  As a re-
sult, shared features tend to receive about twice as much 
input—and thus become about twice as active—as fea-
tures unique to one object or the other.  Thus, since 
trucks and elephants are both “big”, the features repre-
senting “big” should become more active than the fea-
tures trucks and elephants do not share (Figure 1b).  If 
the child can predicate these shared features (i.e., learn 
an explicit representation, such as a unit in a network 
that is connected to the features representing “big”), 
then she will have learned an explicit representation the 
property “big” (Figure 1c).  If she then binds that prop-
erty to the truck (or the elephant) she will have explicit-
ly predicated the property “big” about the truck (or ele-
phant).  Applied to objects with various properties, this 
process can serve to highlight shared properties between 
compared objects and bootstrap their predication.  Once 
representations of various object properties have been 
predicated in this fashion, comparison can also serve to 
link multiple roles together to form multi-place relation-
al structures, as elaborated below.   
One apparent limitation of this comparison-based 
approach to predication is that comparison (by assump-
tion) highlights all the features two objects have in 
common, not just those that are relevant to the property 
or relation that is nominally in question.  For example, 
in addition to being big, a truck and an elephant might 
also both be “in motion”.  As a result, these shared fea-
tures (like the features of “big”) would become high-
lighted and become part of the child’s (initial) explicit 
representation of “big”.  For the same reason, the child’s 
earliest representations of relations (such as above and 
larger-than) would likewise be “corrupted” by irrele-
vant features that just happened to be present in the 
child’s earliest examples of the relations.  Consistent 
with this prediction, Quinn and his colleagues (e.g., 
Quinn et al., 1996) have shown that infants do not ini-
tially represent spatial relations independently of the 
objects over which they hold, and Smith, Sera and Rat-
terman, (1988) have shown that children’s initial rela-
tional representations include properties of the objects 
that participate in these relations.  !
Shared Semantic Pools 
In order to support comparison-based predication, 
the same representational units that represent object 
features must also be able to serve as features of predi-
cates and relational roles.  Consider the problem of ex-
plicitly predicating the property red—that is, transition-
ing from red as feature in a holistic representation of an 
object, to red as an explicit predicate that can take vari-
ous objects as arguments.  If object features and role 
features come from separate pools of units, then red, the 
object feature, will have nothing in common with the 
features of red, the explicit predicate.  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Figure 1.  (a) Representations of an elephant and a truck.   Both are connected to a set of features.  Some features, such as 
“big”, are shared by the elephant and the truck.  (b) When the child thinks about an elephant and a truck simultaneously (e.g., 
during comparison), her representations of elephant and truck both become active simultaneously (denoted by the grey interi-
or).  The elephant and truck representations send activation to their constituent features.  Features shared by both the elephant 
and truck receive twice as much input—because they receive input from both the elephant and the truck—and thus become 
more active than unshared features (greater activation is denoted by the thicker border).  (c) A new unit learns a connection to 
the most active features and thus explicitly represents the featural over-lap of the truck and elephant (i.e., the property “big”).  !
Although this constraint seems straightforward, 
models of relational reasoning have traditionally repre-
sented predicates and objects as qualitatively different 
kinds of things (i.e., as different data types or separate 
pools of units; e.g., Falkenhainer, et al., 1989; Forbus, et 
al., 1995; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 1997, 2003; Keane, Ledgeway, & Duff, 1994; 
Kokinov & Petrov, 2001; Larkey & Love, 2003; 
Salvucci & Anderson, 2001).  In brief, the reason for 
this convention is that the algorithms these models use 
for analogical mapping need to ensure that relations 
map to relations and objects map to objects, and the 
most straightforward way to enforce this constraint is to 
assume that they are simply different kinds of things. 
However, this convention precludes representing a 
property such as “red” as both an object property and as 
an explicit predicate that can take arguments.  As such, 
it precludes learning predicates, or relational roles, by 
comparing objects to discover what they have in com-
mon.  We therefore assume that both objects and rela-
tional roles (predicates) share a common pool of basic 
representational features.   !
Linking Single-place Predicates into Multi-place Rela-
tions 
In a role-filler binding system, once single-place 
predicate-argument bindings have been learned, learn-
ing full-fledged relational structures becomes a matter 
of linking them together.  For example, once a child has 
learned the predicates high (x) and low (y), she can form 
a primitive version of the higher-than (x, y) relation by 
linking them into a single two-place structure (i.e., high 
(x)&low (y)).  Analogical mapping provides a mecha-
nism by which smaller arity structures (e.g., predicates 
with arity-one, or single-place predicates) can be com-
posed into larger arity structures (e.g., predicates with 
arity-two and above, or multi-place relations).  Specifi-
cally, we assume that when sets (pairs or triads) of sin-
gle-place representations enter WM together, they can 
be mapped as a unit onto other such sets of representa-
tions, and that this situation serves as a signal to link the 
single-place predicates into a larger relational structure. 
For example, mapping “high (bird) and low (cat)” onto 
“high (clock) and low (ball)” will bootstrap the forma-
tion of the relations higher-than (bird, cat) and higher-
than (clock, ball).  This hypothesis is supported by the 
results of Doumas & Hummel (2004b), who demon-
strated that mapping lower arity structures can bootstrap 
the formation of higher-arity representations (see also, 
Gentner, 2003; Gentner & Namy, 1999; Gick & 
Holyoak, 1983; Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996; Namy & 
Gentner, 2002; Yamauchi & Markman, 1998, 2000).   !
Summary 
Our approach is based on four constraints (see Table 
1).  Together these constraints constitute our core theo-
retical claims.  First, role-filler binding representations 
reduce the problem of learning relations to the problems 
of learning object properties or relational roles (single-
place predicates) and linking them together to form mul-
ti-place relational structures.  Second, comparison leads 
to the discovery and predication of shared properties, 
and, applied iteratively, results in progressively more 
refined representations of predicates, and eventually 
multi-place relations.  Third, predicates and their argu-
ments share a common representational basis (i.e., both 
predicates and their arguments are coded by a common 
vocabulary of representational primitives).  Fourth, 
mapping multiple predicates of smaller arity leads to the 
formation of higher arity relational structures.  Thus, as 
elaborated in the next section, our general proposal is 
that the same psychological mechanisms that underlie 
analogical inference and schema induction also underlie 
the discovery and predication of the object properties 
and relations that make analogical reasoning possible in 
the first place.   
truck
elephant
red
(a)
big
grey
has-wheels
has-tusks
big ears
has-trailer
truck
elephant
red
(b)
big
grey
has-wheels
has-tusks
big ears
has-trailer
truck
elephant
red
(c)
big
grey
has-wheels
has-tusks
big ears
has-trailer
"big"
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Table 1.  
Core Theoretical Claims and Their Implementation in DORA. 
!
The Model	

Overview 
The heart of the DORA model is a set of algorith-
mic operations for exploiting the core theoretical con-
straints outlined in the previous section.  The resulting 
model provides a mechanistic account of how struc-
tured relational representations can be learned from 
unstructured non-relational beginnings.   
DORA performs four basic operations: Retrieval of 
propositions from long-term-memory (LTM); analogi-
cal mapping of propositions currently in working-
memory; intersection discovery for predication and 
refinement; and linking of role-filler sets into higher-
arity structures via self-supervised learning.  In con-
junction, these operations allow DORA to predicate 
object properties by comparing examples, successively 
refine those predicates into progressively “purer” rep-
resentations of properties (or relational roles), and 
combine lower-arity properties/relational roles into 
higher-arity relations.  Importantly, these same four 
operations (memory retrieval, mapping, intersection 
discovery and self-supervised learning) are also the 
basic operations underlying analogical mapping, infer-
ence and schema induction (see Hummel & Holyoak, 
2003a). 
Elements of DORA’s operation and aspects of its 
knowledge representation are adopted from Hummel 
and Holyoak’s (1997, 2003) LISA model.  Importantly 
however, significant aspects of DORA’s operation and 
knowledge representations depart sharply from those 
of LISA.  Notably, DORA’s use of a single pool of 
units to represent the semantic features of both objects 
and predicates/relational roles, its comparison-based 
learning and refinement routines, its relation formation 
algorithm, and the manner in which its operations work 
together to learn and predicate properties and relations 
are all unique to DORA.  Whereas LISA requires pred-
icates and relations to be hand-coded by the modeler, 
DORA provides and account of how these representa-
tions can be learned in the first place.  Consequently, 
after DORA learns predicates and relations it takes 
LISA as a special case: DORA can simulate all the 
findings that have been simulated with LISA (as elabo-
rated in the Discussion); in contrast, LISA cannot ac-
count for any of the phenomena simulated with DORA 
and reported in this paper.  DORA’s use of a single 
pool of units to represent the semantic features of both 
objects and predicates/relational roles, its comparison-
based learning and refinement routines, its relation 
formation algorithm, and the manner in which its oper-
ations work together to learn and predicate properties 
and relations are all unique to DORA.  Whereas LISA 
requires predicates and relations to be hand-coded by 
the modeler, DORA provides and account of how these 
representations can be learned in the first place.  Con-
sequently, after DORA learns predicates and relations 
it takes LISA as a special case: DORA can simulate all 
the findings that have been simulated with LISA (as 
elaborated in the Discussion); in contrast, LISA cannot 
account for any of the phenomena simulated with 
DORA and reported in this paper.  
We begin by discussing knowledge representation 
in DORA, both the representations it begins with and 
those that it eventually learns.  We then describe how 
DORA performs binding and the flow of activation. 
Finally we describe the operations that allow DORA to 
learn structured relational representations from un-
structured non-relational examples (namely, retrieval, 
mapping, predication and refinement, and relation for-
mation).  For the purposes of clarity, in this section we 
outline DORA’s operation in comparatively broad 
strokes.  The full details of DORA’s operation, along 
with the majority of the equations and parameters, ap-
pear in Appendix A.  
Theoretical Claim Implementation in DORA
1.  Role-filler representations reduce the problem of 
learning relations to the problems of learning object 
properties (single-place predicates) and linking them 
together to form multi-place relational structures.
DORA represents relational structures as linked sets of 
role-filler pairs.  This allows DORA to learn structured 
representations of novel relations from simple object 
representations.
2.  Comparison can lead to the discovery and predica-
tion of shared properties.  
Mapping and intersection discovery routines coupled 
with systematically asynchronous binding leads to the 
isolation and explicit predication of shared semantics.
3.  A common vocabulary of representational primitives 
codes both predicates and their arguments.
Both predicates and objects share the same pool of 
semantic units.
4.  Mapping predicates of smaller arity can lead to the 
formation of higher arity structures.
DORA forms larger arity relational structures (i.e., 
propositions with more RBs) when sets of propositions 
map consistently.
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Figure 2.  The structure of propositions in DORA.  (a) An illustration of the representations that DORA begins with.  An object 
bound to a set of features that describe it.  (b) An illustration of DORA’s relational (i.e., final) representations.  At the bottom 
layer semantic units (small circles) code for the features of individual objects and relational roles.  At the next layer, localist 
PO units code for individual predicates and objects.  Although predicates and objects are not distinct “data types” in DORA 
(see text), we distinguish them in the figures for clarity: Circles for POs acting as objects, and triangles for POs acting as pred-
icates.  At the next layer, localist RB units code for specific role+filler bindings.  At the top layer, localist P units represent 
collections of role-filler bindings that form complete propositions.  Units in the PO, RB, and P layers are represented using 
different shapes for the purposes of clarity.  !!
Knowledge Representation 
As noted previously, the mental representations un-
derlying adult (and older children’s) relational thinking 
are characterized by two properties that make them si-
multaneously flexible, structured and difficult to simu-
late (Doumas & Hummel, 2005; Hummel & Holyoak, 
1997, 2003): Relational roles are represented explicitly 
and independently of their fillers, and role-filler bind-
ings are specified explicitly.  By contrast, young chil-
dren’s representations are holistic (i.e., unstructured) in 
the sense that the features composing the representation 
are not accessible to processing independently of one 
another.  Accordingly, DORA starts with holistic repre-
sentations of objects that simply list the objects’ features 
(Figure 2a).  These kinds of representations are not ca-
pable of supporting relational thinking such as analogy 
or the use of variabalized rules (see Doumas & Hum-
mel, 2005).  Our goal is to provide an account of how 
children transition from representing the world in terms 
of holistic (unstructured) representations of objects, to 
representing the world in a structured fashion that 
makes relations, relational roles and their bindings to 
fillers explicit. !
Individual Propositions	

DORA begins with holistic representations of ob-
jects (Figure 2a), and learns relational representations 
that dynamically bind distributed representations of 
relational roles and objects into explicit propositional 
structures (Figure 2b).  Figure 2a depicts the kind of 
representations with which DORA begins, and Figure 
2b depicts the kind of representations that result from 
the application of its basic operations to representations 
like those in Figure 2a.  We describe the latter represen-
tations (i.e., DORA’s end state) now in order to make 
the rest of the model’s description easier to follow.   
Propositions are represented in four layers of units 
(see Figure 2b).  At the bottom of the hierarchy seman-
tic units code the features of objects and relational roles 
in a distributed fashion (thereby capturing their seman-
tic content).  These units might represent features such 
as visual invariants (e.g., “round”, “square”, “shiny”), 
relational invariants (e.g., “more”, “less”, “same”), di-
mensional properties (e.g., “size-3”, “height-3”, “color-
red”), other perceptual properties (e.g., “sweet”, 
“noisy”, “rough”), complex perceptual/cognitive proper-
ties (e.g., “furry”, “barks”, “has-wheels”, “fast”), cate-
gory information (e.g., “apple”, “dog”, “fire engine”) 
and information identifying individuals (e.g., “me”, 
“Spot”, “Jane”, “mommy”).   
In this paper we label semantic units both in the text 
and figures.  For example, we might label a semantic 
unit “big”.  Of course we do not claim that this unit is 
the “right” representation of the property big.  The la-
bels attached to semantics are arbitrary and mean noth-
ing to DORA.  We use them only for clarity of exposi-
tion and for interpreting the model’s behavior.  Rather, 
our claim is that some set of units code the relevant 
properties of attributes, relations and relational roles. 
The crucial aspect of these units is that they are inde-
pendent of one another in the sense that they represent 
separable properties (e.g., a unit that codes for “red” 
will become active in response to any red object, not 
only, say, red objects in the upper-left of the visual 
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field).  Many such features are detectable from the out-
puts of early visual processing (e.g., V1), as demon-
strated by Hummel and Biederman’s (1992) JIM model 
of object recognition.  Indeed, many of DORA’s feature 
units (namely, those coding for basic visual and rela-
tional invariants) correspond precisely to the kinds of 
features activated in the third and fifth layers of the JIM 
model.  As noted previously, these features can serve to 
bootstrap the discovery and predication of relations, but 
are not themselves capable of supporting explicit rela-
tional thought. 
At the next layer localist predicate and object (PO) 
units code for individual predicates (relational roles or 
attributes) and objects.  Each PO unit serves as a token 
for the role or object it represents and is connected to 
the semantic units corresponding to its features.  For 
example, the token for the object Fido in the proposition 
bigger (Fido, Sara) would be connected to a set of se-
mantics corresponding to the features of Fido (e.g., 
“adult”, “male”, “dog”), while the token for the rela-
tional role larger would be connected to a set of seman-
tics corresponding to its features (as would the token for 
Sara and the smaller role; see Figure 2b).   
Above the PO units a layer of localist role-binding 
units (RBs) encode the bindings of relational roles to 
their fillers.  For example, the proposition bigger (Fido, 
Sara) contains two RB units, one representing the bind-
ing larger(Fido), and one smaller(Sara) (Figure 2b). 
Each RB unit encodes one role-filler binding and shares 
bi-directional excitatory connections with one predicate 
and one argument (which can either be an object or a 
whole proposition, as detailed below).  Above the RB 
units, a layer of proposition (P) units binds sets of RBs 
into multi-place relations.  For example, the P unit en-
coding the relation bigger (Fido, Sara) has bi-directional 
excitatory connections with the RBs encoding larger 
(Fido) and smaller (Sara).  All localist token units (POs, 
RBs, and Ps) laterally inhibit all units in the same layer 
(e.g., P units in the driver inhibit other driver Ps, RBs in 
the recipient inhibit other recipient RBs; driver and re-
cipient are defined below).   
Each level of the representational hierarchy serves 
an important purpose.  The semantic units capture the 
semantically rich (i.e., distributed) nature of human 
mental representations.  The three layers of localist units 
make it possible to treat each level of the hierarchy as 
an independent entity for the purposes of mapping and 
inference (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003).  These 
localist units (i.e., POs, RBs, and Ps) are not different 
“kinds” of units (i.e., they do not work differently). 
Rather, they are simply units in different layers of the 
network.  We use different names for the units in each 
layer (and different shapes in the figures) only to make 
them easier to distinguish.   
RB units encode the bindings of specific roles to 
specific fillers conjunctively; likewise, P units bind col-
lections of role-filler bindings into full propositions in a 
conjunctive fashion. For the purposes of storage in (and 
retrieval from) LTM this kind of conjunctive coding is 
sufficient (even necessary; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 
2003; Shastri, 1996).  However, conjunctive coding 
violates role-filler independence (in the sense that a 
given role [or filler] is represented by different units 
depending on the filler [role] to which it happens to be 
bound), making it inadequate as a basis for binding in 
WM (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Hummel et al, 2004).   !
Dynamic Role-Filler Binding	

When a proposition enters WM (i.e., when it be-
comes active), its role-filler bindings must be represent-
ed explicitly (and dynamically) on the units that pre-
serve role-filler independence (i.e., the PO and semantic 
units).  A common approach to dynamic binding in 
neural network models of perception and cognition is 
based on synchrony of role-filler firing (see Hummel et 
al., 2004, for a review): Units representing relational 
roles fire in synchrony with the arguments bound to 
those roles and out of synchrony with other role-filler 
bindings.  For example, to represent bigger (Fido, Sara), 
the units representing the larger role fire in synchrony 
with those representing Fido while those representing 
smaller fire in synchrony with those representing Sara. 
Critically, the larger and Fido units must fire out of syn-
chrony with the smaller and Sara units (Figure 3a).  This 
approach to dynamic binding has the virtue that the 
bindings are represented both explicitly and indepen-
dently of the units so bound: If Sara suddenly gained 
weight, the proposition bigger (Sara, Fido) could be 
represented by the very same semantic and PO units 
simply by reversing the synchrony relations.  Another 
virtue of role-filler synchrony for binding is that it pro-
vides a natural a priori account of the limitations of 
visual attention and WM because only a limited number 
of RBs can be simultaneously active and still be mutual-
ly out of synchrony (Hummel & Holyoak, 2003; Morri-
son, Doumas & Richland, 2006; Morrison et al., 2004; 
Viskontas et al., 2004).   
One limitation of binding by role-filler synchrony is 
that it implicitly assumes that predicates and objects are 
different “data types”: Because object semantics fire at 
the same time as the predicate semantics to which they 
are bound, the only way to know whether a given unit 
represents an object feature or a predicate feature is to 
assume that the two are represented by separate (non-
overlapping) pools of semantic feature units (see Hum-
mel & Holyoak, 2003).  As noted earlier, this “different 
data types” assumption, while convenient for many pur-
poses, precludes learning attributes (such as “red” or 
“small”) or relations (such as “same color” or “larger”) 
from the properties of examples.  Role-filler synchrony 
of firing is thus inadequate as a binding signal for our 
current purposes.  !!
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Figure 3.  The firing of the proposition bigger (Fido, Sara) in DORA.  (a) Binding by role-filler synchrony.  The units for the 
larger (Fido) role binding fire followed by those for the smaller (Sara) role binding.  (b) Binding by role-filler asynchrony.  The 
units for the larger role fire followed by the units for Fido, then the units for the smaller role fire followed by those for Sara. 
(c) A time-series illustration of the firing of units during asynchronous binding.  Each graph corresponds to one unit from (b) 
(specifically, the unit with the same name).  The y-axis represents the unit’s activation, the x-axis time.  Prop = P unit. !
Under binding by role-filler synchrony, roles fire in 
synchrony with the fillers to which they are bound and 
out of synchrony with other role-filler bindings (Figure 
3a).  Importantly, although role-filler bindings from the 
same proposition fire out of synchrony with one anoth-
er, they fire in closer temporal proximity than bindings 
belonging to separate propositions.   This close tempo1 -
ral proximity plays a crucial role in disambiguating 
which role-filler bindings are part of the same proposi-
tion.  This notion can be generalized to represent dy-
namic role-filler bindings while still permitting a single 
pool of units to represent the semantic features of both 
predicates and objects.  The idea is that roles fire, not in 
synchrony with their fillers, but in close temporal prox-
imity (see Figure 3b and c).  That is, role-filler binding 
is represented, not as temporal synchrony of firing, but 
as systematic asynchrony of firing (see Love, 1999). 
Although this approach may sound like the opposite of 
binding by synchrony, it is in fact a generalization of the 
same idea.   
In DORA, role-filler bindings are represented by 
systematic asynchrony of firing (see Figure 3b and c). 
For example, to represent bigger (Fido, Sara), the PO 
unit for larger, along with its semantic features, fires 
followed by the units representing Fido, followed by the 
units for smaller, followed by the units for Sara.  The 
binding of Fido to larger (rather than smaller) is carried 
by the fact that Fido fires in immediate temporal prox-
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 For this reason, among others, it is necessary for a given role-filler binding to fire more than once.  For example, if A represents 1
“larger+Fido” and B “smaller+Sara”, then the proposition bigger (Fido, Sara) would be represented by the sequence ABABAB.  
If C represents “larger+Bill” and D “smaller+Mary” then the propositions bigger (Fido, Sara) and bigger (Bill, Mary) would be 
represented by the sequence ABABABCDCDCD; the propositions bigger (Fido, Mary) and bigger (Bill, Sara) would be repre-
sented ADADADCBCBCB.  Thus, temporal proximity signals which bindings belong together as parts of the same proposition.
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imity to larger (as described more fully under Establish-
ing Asynchrony of Firing below).  For clarity of exposi-
tion, we describe this process as taking place with roles 
firing before their fillers (see Appendix A).  However, 
none of DORA’s learning routines (predicate learning, 
refinement, and multi-place relation formation) are af-
fected by whether roles or fillers fire first.   
Under asynchronous binding, information is carried 
by when units fire rather than which units are firing.  As 
a result, there is no need to use different types of units 
(as in SME; Fakenheiner et al., 1989; Forbus et al., 
1995; or STAR; Halford et al., 1998) or different sets of 
units (as in LISA; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003) to 
represent relations/relational roles and objects.  Conse-
quently, predicates and objects in DORA are coded with 
a common set of semantic units.  The capacity to treat 
role and filler semantics equivalently and still specify 
their bindings dynamically makes all of DORA’s other 
operations possible.   !
Representing higher-order relations	

When a proposition takes another proposition as an 
argument, the P unit of the lower-order proposition 
serves as the argument under the appropriate RB unit of 
the higher-order proposition.  For example, in the high-
er-order relation causes (gravity, revolve-around (earth, 
sun)), the P unit of the proposition revolve-around 
(earth, sun) serves as the argument of the caused role of 
the higher-order cause relation (see Figure 4).  Howev-
er, none of our simulations use this ability so we do not 
discuss it further.   
Figure 4.  Illustration of the structure of a higher-order rela-
tional proposition in DORA.  !
Flow of Control 
Driver, Recipient, Emerging Recipient, and LTM	

For the purposes of all the operations DORA per-
forms, propositions are divided into four sets (Hummel 
& Holyoak, 1997, 2003): a driver, a recipient, an emerg-
ing recipient, and long-term memory (LTM). The driver 
contains the proposition or propositions that are the cur-
rent focus of attention.   All of DORA’s operations are 2
controlled by the driver.  Propositions in the driver pass 
activation to the semantic units.  Because the semantic 
units are shared by propositions in all sets, activation 
flows from the driver to propositions in the other three 
sets.  During retrieval, patterns of activation generated 
on the semantic units retrieve propositions from LTM 
into the recipient.  Propositions in the recipient are 
available for mapping onto propositions in the driver. 
As detailed below, DORA then learns and refines ex-
plicit representations of the features common to the ob-
jects and predicates in the driver and the recipient, and 
can form higher arity structures from mapped lower 
arity structures.  The new predicates, objects and propo-
sitions are encoded into the emerging recipient (equiva-
lent to a schema in Hummel & Holyoak’s, 2003, LISA), 
and may later be encoded into LTM and subsequently 
enter the driver or recipient.  !
Establishing Asynchrony of Firing	

One at a time, P units (propositions) in the driver 
become active (if there are no P units in the driver, then 
the units in the next level of the hierarchy, here RBs, 
become active), exciting their RBs, which compete (via 
lateral inhibition) to become active.  Similarly, RBs ex-
cite their POs, which also compete to become active. 
Each RB and PO is an oscillator consisting of an excita-
tory unit (an exciter) yoked to an inhibitory unit (an 
inhibitor).  Exciters pass activation to their inhibitors 
and to any inhibitors in lower layers (i.e., RB exciters 
pass activation to PO inhibitors).  Inhibitors (which 
have a long temporal integration period), in turn, inhibit 
their exciters.  As a result, in response to a fixed excita-
tory input from some other unit (e.g., in the case of an 
RB input from a P unit), the activation of an excitatory 
unit will tend to oscillate (see Hummel & Holyoak, 
1997).  Groups of such oscillators that share mutually 
inhibitory connections (such as RBs and POs) will tend 
to oscillate out of synchrony with one another.  PO in-
hibitors receive roughly twice the input of RB inhibitors 
(recall that they receive input both from their own PO 
and any active RBs).  Therefore, POs oscillate at rough-
ly twice the rate of RBs.   
Collectively, these excitatory and inhibitory interac-
tions have the following effects:  When a P unit be-
comes active it excites its RBs, one of which becomes 
active.  The active RB, in turn, excites its POs, one of 
which becomes active.  When the inhibitor on the first 
PO becomes active, it inhibits that PO, allowing the 
second PO to become active.  Likewise, once the active 
 As detailed in Appendix A, within the driver, those propositions that are currently active constitute the phase set—the set of 2
mutually desynchronized role-filler bindings (see Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).  In general, the driver will contain too many 
propositions to fit all of them into the phase set simultaneously.  However, in all the simulations reported here, the driver consists 
of only a single phase set.  Therefore, for clarity, we discuss the model’s operation in terms of the driver, rather than the phase set.
revolver+Earth revolved-around+Sun
revolves (Earth, Sun)
revolver revolved-aroundEarth Sun
cause (gravity, revolve (Earch, Sun))
causer+gravity caused+(revolves (Earth, Sun))
caused
causer
gravity
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RB is inhibited, the next RB connected to the active P 
becomes active and excites its POs, one of which be-
comes active, followed by the second PO, and so forth. 
In order to distinguish boundaries between separate 
RBs, DORA produces an inhibitory “refresh” signal 
(e.g., Horn, Sagi, & Usher, 1992; Horn & Usher, 1990; 
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003; von der Malsburg & 
Buhmann, 1992) at the level of role-bindings (RBs) 
when no RB exciter is active above a threshold (i.e., 
after a RB inhibitor fires).  An analogous inhibitory sig-
nal is produced at the level of POs when no PO is active 
above threshold.  The resulting pattern of activation on 
the semantic units is (for a two-role proposition):  role1, 
/refresh/, filler1, /refresh//REFRESH/, role2, /refresh/, 
filler2, /refresh//REFRESH/, where /refresh/ is the in-
hibitory signal produced at the level of POs, and /RE-
FRESH/ is the inhibitory signal produced at the level of 
RBs.  (See Appendix A for details.)  Although these 
operations may appear complex, they are all locally 
realizable as exchanges of excitatory and inhibitory sig-
nals between units. !
Unit Activation	

All token units in DORA update their activations 
according to the simple leaky integrator function, !
                      (1) !
where Δai is the change in activation of unit i, γ is a 
growth rate, ni is the net input to unit i, and δ is a decay 
constant.  Activation is hard limited between zero and 
one.  Net input, ni, is a simple weighted sum: 
                              (2) 
where wij is the connection weight from unit j to unit i, 
and aj is the activation of j.  Semantic units compute 
their activations as,  
                               (3) 
!
where ni is input to unit i and max(ni) is the maximum 
input to any semantic unit.   
For simplicity, propositions fire in a random order. 
However, Hummel and Holyoak (1997; 2003) describe 
an algorithm that allows that network to determine the 
order in which propositions fire, based on constraints 
such as pragmatic centrality (Holyoak & Thagard, 
1989), causal relations and other higher-order relations 
(see Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Viskontas et al., 2004). !
Retrieval from LTM 
One of the most basic operations DORA performs is 
to retrieve a proposition or analog (situation, story, or 
event) from LTM given a driver as a cue.  The model’s 
algorithm for retrieval also forms an essential part of its 
algorithm for mapping, comparison and predication. 
Retrieval in DORA is a form of guided pattern recogni-
tion (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997): Patterns of activation 
generated by the driver on the semantic units excite to-
ken units in LTM.  Propositions and RBs in LTM be-
come active to the extent that their roles and fillers are 
semantically similar to the patterns generated by the 
driver, and are retrieved into the recipient as a proba-
bilistic function of their activation (see Appendix A).   !
Mapping 
Analogical mapping is the processes of discovering 
which elements (objects, relational roles, whole proposi-
tions, etc.) of one analog correspond to which elements 
of another.  In DORA, mapping guides the predication 
of new properties, the formation of new relations, and 
refinement of these properties and relations.  Mapping is 
performed by the same guided pattern recognition that 
drives retrieval, augmented with the ability to learn 
mapping connections between coactive units in the dri-
ver and recipient.  A collection of mapping hypotheses, 
hij, is generated for each unit, i, in the recipient and for 
every unit, j, of the same type in the driver (i.e., P units 
have mapping hypotheses for P units, RBs for RBs, 
etc.).   At each instant in time, t, mapping hypothesis hij 3
accumulates evidence that unit i corresponds to unit j 
using a simple Hebbian learning rule:   !
                                     (4) !
where ai and aj are the activations of units i and j.   
After the propositions in the driver have fired, the 
mapping hypotheses are used to update numerical 
weights, wij, on the mapping connections (Hummel & 
Holyoak, 1997; see Appendix A for details).   The map-
ping connections serve to represent the correspondences 
between elements of the driver and recipient.  Because 
mapping connections allow driver units to excite recipi-
ent units directly (as opposed to strictly through the se-
mantic units), they allow mappings the model has dis-
covered earlier in the mapping process to constrain 
mappings discovered later.  Hummel and Holyoak 
(1997) demonstrated that this algorithm provides a nat-
ural account of the strengths and limitations of human 
analogical mapping.  It also correctly predicted previ-
Δai = γni(1.1− ai) −δai]01
ni = wija j ,
j
∑
ai =
ni
max(ni)
,
Δhijt = ai
t a
j
t ,
 We assume that each mapping hypothesis is a unit that accumulates and compares evidence that a given unit, j, in the driver 3
maps to a given unit, i, in the recipient, and that both mapping hypotheses and the mapping connection weights they will ulti-
mately inform are not realized literally as synaptic weights, but rather correspond to neurons in prefrontal cortex with rapidly 
modifiable synapses (e.g., Asaad, Rainer & Miller, 1998; Fuster, 1997; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003).
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ously unknown properties of human analogical mapping 
(Kubose, Holyoak & Hummel, 2002).   
Mapping connection weights are constrained to take 
values between 0 and 1—that is, the mapping connec-
tions themselves are strictly excitatory.  However, in 
addition to the excitatory signals transmitted over indi-
vidual mapping connections, each driver unit also 
transmits a global inhibitory input to all recipient units 
of the same type (i.e., PO units to PO units, RB units to 
RB units; see Eq. 9 in Appendix A).  This inhibitory 
signal, Iij, is proportional to the activation of the driver 
unit aj, the value of the recipient unit’s largest in-coming 
weight, max(wi), and the value of that unit’s largest out-
going mapping weight, max(wj): !
                  (5) !
As detailed shortly, this signal plays a crucial role in the 
model’s self-supervised learning algorithm and thus in 
the discovery and predication of new properties and 
relations.   !
Comparison-based Predication 
DORA performs comparison-based predication us-
ing a simple algorithm for intersection discovery.  When 
DORA compares its two objects, for example, an ele-
phant and a bear (Figure 5a), it will attempt to map 
them.  After mapping, units in the driver will activate 
corresponding units in the recipient.  Active units in 
both the driver and the recipient pass excitation to the 
semantic units.  As a result, semantic units connected to 
coactive POs in both the driver and the recipient tend to 
get about twice as much input—and thus become about 
twice as active (recall Eq. 3)—as any semantics con-
nected to only one PO or the other (see Figure 5b). The 
resulting heightened activation for semantics shared by 
both the driver and recipient POs serves to signal that 
those semantics are shared: That is, the semantic inter-
section of two POs is tagged as such by the units’ 
heightened activations.   
DORA exploits this activation-based intersection 
tagging in order to explicitly predicate the semantic 
properties shared by the coactive POs.   Specifically, 
when DORA maps (i.e., compares) a solitary PO in the 
driver to a solitary PO in the recipient, it recruits a new 
PO unit in the recipient to learn the semantic intersec-
tion of the two compared objects. (Of course, we do not 
assume the brain grows a neuron to correspond to the 
active PO.  Rather, we assume the new unit is recruited 
by the same process that recruits structure units at the 
time of encoding; see Hummel & Holyoak, 2003.) 
Newly inferred PO units have activation=1 and learn 
connections to all active semantics according to: !
                         (6) 
!
where Δwij is the change in weight between the new PO 
unit, i, and semantic unit, j, ai and aj are the activations 
of i and j, respectively, and γ  is a growth rate parameter. 
By this equation, the weight between the new PO and a 
semantic unit asymptotes to that semantic’s activation. 
Because semantics shared by the two compared POs 
tend to be about twice as active as semantics unique to 
one of the two compared POs, the new PO becomes 
approximately twice as strongly connected to the se-
mantics shared by the compared POs than to semantics 
that are unshared (Figure 5c). The result is a new repre-
sentation defined by the common features of the com-
pared POs.  The active PO units in the recipient signal 
DORA to recruit an empty RB unit (also in the recipi-
ent) that becomes active and learns connections to the 
two active PO units (the recipient object and the new 
PO) by simple Hebbian learning (Figure 5d).  In short, 
comparison based learning causes DORA to represent 
the features shared by the compared objects as an ex-
plicit predicate (i.e., a PO unit) that is bound to one of 
the compared objects.  If the shared features denote a 
categorical property (e.g., “red”, “big”, etc.), then the 
resulting PO will represent that property as a single-
place predicate.  If the shared features denote a relation-
al property (e.g., “same-color”, “more-size”, etc.), then 
the resulting PO will again represent that property as a 
single-place (relational) predicate. As elaborated under 
Forming Relations (below), it is this latter kind of sin-
gle-place predicate that is most likely to eventually 
serve as one role of a multi-place relation.  
This algorithm recruits a new PO unit whenever two 
existing POs (predicates or objects) are explicitly com-
pared to one another.  Although the algorithm might 
appear to result in an explosion of PO units (one for 
every comparison ever made), it is at worst comparable 
to an exemplar-based model of category representation 
(e.g., Nosofsky, 1988).  According to exemplar models, 
a category is represented in memory by storing, individ-
ually, all e exemplars of that category.  If there are c 
categories, each with (on average) e exemplars, then 
there will be c * e = t total exemplars in memory.  In the 
very worst case, that is, if DORA compares every ex-
emplar of every category with every other exemplar of 
every category, then the number of first-order (i.e., ob-
ject-object) comparisons is t2.  If it compares the results 
of every one of those comparisons with every other re-
sult of those comparisons, then the number of second-
order (i.e., predicate-predicate) comparisons is still only 
t2^2 = t4.   In other words, under the very worst scenario 
in which DORA compares absolutely everything it 
knows to absolutely everything else it knows, the num-
ber of POs resulting from these comparisons grows only 
as a polynomial function of the number of objects, t, in 
its memory.   !
Iij = a j (max(wi) +max(w j )),
Δwij = ai(a j − wij )γ
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Figure 5.  Comparison based predication.  (a) An elephant and a bear are compared (for the purposes of clarity, mapping con-
nections are not depicted in the figure).  (b) Semantics shared by both the elephant and bear become more active than unshared 
semantics.  (c) A new PO (here a triangle to differentiate it from other active PO units) is recruited and learns connections to 
the active semantics in proportion to their activation.  (d) The new unit is bound to the bear unit via an RB unit.  Solid lines = 
strong connections, dashed lines = weaker connections, gray = more active units.  ! !
However, even this kind of polynomial growth is a 
gross overestimate of the number of POs produced by 
DORA’s comparison algorithm.  The polynomial growth 
requires DORA to compare everything it knows to 
everything else (e.g., compare this chicken to that bowl 
of oatmeal you had last Tuesday, and to that hot air bal-
loon, and to your toenail, etc.).  Obviously, no child will 
compare everything she knows to every other thing she 
knows.  As elaborated in the General Discussion, there 
must be strong psychological constraints on when ob-
jects (or predicates or relations) will be compared to one 
another, and these constraints will greatly reduce the 
number of comparisons that get made, and thus the 
number of POs that get recruited.  Candidate constraints 
include things such as verbal labeling, and explicit di-
rection (e.g., from an adult) to compare objects.  With 
such constraints in hand, the proliferation of POs be-
comes much less problematic.  Moreover, we do not 
assume that, once recruited, a PO becomes a permanent 
part of a child’s LTM.  Especially if a PO is rarely used 
or rarely participates in additional comparisons, it is 
reasonable to assume that the neurons recruited to repre-
sent it will eventually be re-recruited to represent new 
things.  
Predicate Refinement 
The first time DORA learns a new predicate, that 
predicate will almost invariably contain a number of 
extraneous semantic features.  For example, in the case 
of predicating the concept “big” by comparing an ele-
phant to a bear (Figure 5), the resulting big predicate 
will also be connected strongly to any other properties 
the elephant and bear in question happen to share (e.g., 
“animal”), as well as weakly to all their unique features. 
That is, newly-predicated properties will initially be 
object-specific.  Likewise, the second time DORA pred-
icates “big”, for example by comparing a house to a 
truck, the resulting predicate will also be object-specific 
and contain extraneous semantics that the house and 
truck happen to share (e.g., “rectangular”).  However, 
the same intersection-discovery algorithm that causes 
DORA to start to extract “big” from elephant and bear, 
and from house and truck, when coupled with the capac-
ity for self-supervised learning (SSL; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 2003), allows DORA to further refine its un-
derstanding of “big” by comparing its first (elephant and 
bear) big predicate to its second (house and truck) big 
predicate. When DORA compares its two “big” predi-
cates-object pairs, by comparing, say, big (Bear) to big 
(House) it will first map them (Figure 6a).  Consequent-
ly, units in the driver will activate corresponding units in 
the recipient.  In a second (initially empty) emerging 
recipient DORA recruits new units to correspond to 
active units in the driver (Figure 6b).  DORA uses the 
mapping-based global inhibition as a cue for detecting 
when a unit must be recruited in the emerging recipient. 
If a unit, i, in the recipient maps to some unit, j, in the 
driver, then i will be globally inhibited by all other units, 
k ≠ j, in the driver (recall Eq. 5).  Therefore, if some 
unit, k, in the driver maps to nothing in the emerging 
recipient (or if the emerging recipient is empty), then 
when k fires, it will inhibit all emerging recipient units 
and it will excite no units in the emerging recipient (see 
Hummel & Holyoak, 2003). This kind of global map-
ping-based inhibition, unaccompanied by any mapping-
based excitation, serves as a reliable cue that nothing in 
the emerging recipient analog corresponds to driver unit 
k.  It therefore causes DORA to recruit a new unit to 
correspond to k.  As during comparison-based predica-
tion, DORA learns connections between active seman-
tics and new POs by Eq. 6, and between active corre-
sponding token units (i.e., between POs and RBs, and 
between RBs and Ps) by simple Hebbian learning (Fig-
ure 6c).  This occurs for each driver PO that fires (Fig-
ure 6d and e).  So, when DORA compares big (Bear) to 
big (House), the refined representation of the predicate 
big will have a connection weight of 1.0 to the shared 
semantics of the two big predicates (i.e., the semantic 
feature “big”), and a connection weight of roughly 0.5 
to extraneous semantics connected to only one of the 
two “dirty” big predicates (e.g., the semantics “animal” 
and “rectangular”).  Applied iteratively, this process 
produces progressively more refined representations of 
the compared predicates, eventually resulting in a 
“pure” representation of the property or relation, free of 
extraneous semantics.  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Figure 6.  Schema based predicate refinement.  (a) The two propositions are mapped (semi-dashed lines indicate mapping con-
nections; for the purposes of clarity, mapping connections are not depicted in the remaining components of the figure).  (b) The 
two mapped big predicates fire.  New PO and RB unit are recruited to match the firing PO and RB in the driver.  (c) The new 
PO learns a connection to the new RB, and learns connections to active semantics in proportion to their activation.  (d) The two 
mapped objects fire.  A new PO is recruited to match the firing PO in the driver (an RB to match the firing RB was learned in 
(b)).  (e) The new PO learns connections to the RB and to active semantics in proportion to their activation.  The result is a 
schematized “cleaner” representation of the property big.  Full lines = strong connections, dashed lines = weaker connections, 
darker gray = more active units.  !
Importantly, this same process works both on single 
role-filler sets and on multi-place relational structures 
composed of multiple role-filler sets (see below).  Over 
the course of several comparisons, the algorithm retains 
the invariant semantic features that define a property, 
relational role or whole relation.  For instance, if DORA 
compares many instances of the bigger relation, it will 
learn a representation of the invariant properties of the 
roles of bigger.  Moreover, if DORA compares two rela-
tions like bigger and higher it will learn a representation 
of the invariant properties of the roles of those two rela-
tions, in this case the relation more-than.   
An important prediction of this algorithm is that 
features will be hard to purge from a concept to the ex-
tent that they are shared by many examples of that con-
cept.  For example, if a child always compares objects 
in which the larger object is red and the smaller blue, 
then the algorithm predicts that, for that child, “red” will 
be a feature of “larger-than” and “blue” a feature of 
“smaller-than”.  Fortunately, in most children’s experi-
ence, color is not systematically confounded with size. 
However, examples of this kind of confounding do oc-
cur in children’s experience.  For example, most things 
that sleep also happen to have eyes.  The algorithm thus 
predicts that “has eyes” is likely to be included, at least 
early on (i.e., before counter examples), in the concept 
“sleeps”.  There is substantial evidence that children 
have difficulty purging widely present features from 
their concepts.  For example, children tend to think that 
things that sleep have eyes, and that things that move 
have legs (e.g., Sheya & Smith, 2006).  DORA’s inter-
section discovery algorithm thus provides a natural ac-
count of such early errors of inclusion.   
The algorithm also provides a natural account of 
children’s ability to ignore omnipresent features—such 
as “has boundaries” and “is smaller than the 
universe”—that are not simply confounded with some 
other features (in the way that “has eyes” is confounded 
with “sleeps”), but instead are confounded with every-
thing.  Inasmuch as such features are ever represented at 
all (which we doubt they are until adulthood), they will 
have exactly zero effect on DORA’s behavior, precisely 
because they are omnipresent.  The reason is that al-
though adding a constant feature to every object will 
increase the pair-wise similarity of every object, x, to 
every other object, y, it would also increase the pair-
wise similarity of every pair, (x, y), by the same amount, 
for all x and all y.  As a result, no feature that appears on 
every object will have any effect on DORA’s perfor-
mance.   !
Forming Relations 
Comparison allows DORA to discover the shared 
semantic features of separate objects and represent them 
as explicit predicates that take arguments (e.g., big 
(Bear)).  However, it is one thing to learn that one object 
is big and another is small, but it is another thing to 
learn the relation bigger-than and predicate it over mul-
tiple arguments. 
Learning a relation that takes multiple arguments 
entails solving two problems, each of which is related to 
the problems entailed in learning single-place predi-
cates.  The first problem, hinted at previously, is that the 
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invariants that describe relational roles differ from those 
that describe simple object properties.  For example, 
“bigger-than” is not the same as “big”.  If an object is 
bound to a relational role specifying “bigger-than”, then 
some other object must be bound to the complementary 
role specifying “smaller-than”.  In other words, deciding 
which of two objects is bigger and which smaller re-
quires a capacity to compare the two.   
Hummel and Biederman (1992; see also Hummel & 
Holyoak, 2002) describe a simple neural comparator 
circuit that takes, as input, representations of numerical 
values along a dimension (such as size) and as output 
returns relative values along that dimension (such as 
“bigger” and “smaller”).  For example, given “size-5” 
and “size-8” as input, Hummel and Biederman’s com-
parator will activate the feature for “bigger” in response 
to “size-8” and the feature for “smaller” in response to 
“size-5”.  We have adapted this comparator circuit for 
use in DORA.  Whenever DORA activates two POs in 
the driver simultaneously, and those POs both have fea-
tures describing values along the same metric dimension 
(e.g., size, color, height, etc.), DORA invokes the com-
parator.  Similar to Hummel and Biederman’s compara-
tor, DORA’s comparator activates the semantic unit 
“more” in synchrony with the larger value along the 
dimension, the semantic unit “less” in synchrony with 
the smaller, and the semantic unit “same” if the two 
values are equal.  Following Hummel and Biederman 
our comparator thus assumes implicit knowledge of 
dimensions (an assumption that is not unreasonable, see 
Feigenson et al., 2002).  These semantics are then con-
nected to the active POs by Eq. 6.  The resulting “more, 
“less” and “same” semantics, along with the semantics 
describing the dimension itself (e.g., “size-x”, etc.), pro-
vide the relational semantics for DORA’s emerging rela-
tional predicates. 
Given a set of relational semantics bound to individ-
ual roles, the next problem is to link those roles together 
into a representation of a multi-place relation.  DORA 
solves this problem by exploiting the temporal dynam-
ics of binding by asynchrony. For example, if DORA 
thinks about a dog (size-6) and a cat (size-4) at the same 
time, then the comparator will attach “more” to “size-6” 
and “less” to “size-4”.  The resulting role-argument 
bindings (i.e., more+size-6 (dog) and less+size-4 (cat)) 
may remind DORA of a previously experienced com-
parison, say, more+size-9 (bear) and less+size-5 (fox), 
permitting DORA to map the dog and the cat onto the 
bear and the fox, respectively, along with their relational 
roles.  The result of this mapping is a distinct pattern of 
firing on the units in the recipient: The units encoding 
more+size-6 (dog) and less+size-4 (cat) oscillate out of 
synchrony in the driver, and, through their mapping 
connections, impose the same systematic oscillatory 
pattern on more+size-9 (bear) and less+size-5 (fox) in 
the recipient (as illustrated in Figure 7a-d).  Units in the 
recipient will exhibit this systematic oscillatory firing 
pattern only under two circumstances: When the role-
filer pairs in question are already bound into a single 
relational structure (via a P unit), or when similar sets of 
role-filler pairs are in WM simultaneously and are 
mapped as a group (i.e., when they could be bound into 
a single relational structure; as in the current example). 
Importantly, this firing pattern is not something that 
DORA must learn; it is a pattern that emerges as a nat-
ural consequence of binding using time.  This temporal 
firing pattern, coupled with DORA’s self-supervised 
learning algorithm, bootstraps the learning of multi-
place relational structures.  During relation formation, 
when an RB in the recipient becomes active, a P unit is 
recruited by SSL (also in the recipient) if no other P 
units are active (Figure 8a).  The new P unit remains 
active until the Ps (or RBs if there are no Ps) in the dri-
ver have all fired, and learns connections to active RBs 
as during SSL (i.e., via Hebbian learning; Figure 8b-d). 
The result is a P unit linking the oscillating role-filler 
pairs in the recipient into a multi-place relation.   The 
resulting proposition explicitly codes the relation big-
ger-than (bear, fox).  In summary, DORA exploits the 
oscillations of the RB units in the recipient to form a 
new relation: RBs that fire sequentially become compo-
nent roles of the new relational structure (encoded by 
the P unit), and the completion of firing of the driver Ps 
(or RBs) marks the end of the relational structure. 
As during predicate learning, the resulting relational 
roles will initially be specific to the values from which 
they were learned (e.g., the roles of the resulting bigger-
than relation will be connected to “size-9” and 
“size-5”).  However, the predicate refinement routines 
described above, applied iteratively to different exam-
ples of the bigger-than relation, will eventually yield a 
value-independent representation of bigger-than.   !
Order of Operations 
The order in which DORA performs the various op-
erations described above (e.g., predication, refinement, 
etc.) is determined only by the state of DORA’s knowl-
edge.  If there is a proposition (or a pair of propositions) 
in the driver but none in the recipient, then DORA first 
attempts to retrieve a similar proposition (or proposi-
tions) from LTM.  Given one or more propositions in 
both the driver and recipient, DORA next attempts to 
map the driver proposition(s) onto the recipient proposi-
tion(s).  After mapping DORA initiates learning: If there 
are no mapped RBs in the driver, or if the mapped RBs 
are connected to only one PO unit (a situation that indi-
cates that the active objects not bound to any relational 
roles), then DORA performs comparison-based predica-
tion.  After one or more roles have been predicated, 
DORA attempts to form new relations, and refine its 
existing representations.  DORA followed this order of 
operations in all the simulations reported here..   !
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Figure 7.  When one set of single-place predicates is mapped to another set of single place predicates a diagnostic firing pattern 
necessarily emerges.  Role-filler sets in the driver oscillate out of synchrony and impose the same systematic oscillatory pattern 
on the recipient units to which they map (darker units = more active units).  For example, when the set more+size-6 (dog) and 
less+size-4 (cat) are mapped to more+size-9 (bear) and less+size-5 (fox) the following firing pattern emerges: (a) First the PO 
unit encoding more+size-6 in the driver and its RB unit fire, which excites the PO unit encoding more+size-9 and its corre-
sponding RB in the recipient.  (b) Then the objects bound to those predicates (dog and bear) and their corresponding RBs fire. 
(c) Next the mapped POs encoding less+size-4 and less+size-5 and their corresponding RBs fire.  (d) Then the objects bound 
to those predicates (cat and fox) fire and their corresponding RBs fire.  !!
!  
Figure 8.  Forming a multi-place relational structure by mapping sets of single place predicates (darker units = more active 
units).  DORA uses the systematic time-sharing of RBs that is imposed on units in the recipient by units in the driver (see Fig-
ure 7 and text) and recruits a new P unit in the recipient.  As the mapped POs and RBs fire in sequence the new P unit learns 
connections to active RBs.  (a-b) As the more+size-9 PO, the bear PO and the RB encoding their binding fire, the model learns 
a connection between the active RB and P unit by Hebbian learning.  (c-d) Similarly, as the less+size-5 PO, the fox PO and the 
RB encoding their binding fire, the model learns a connection between the active RB and P unit by Hebbian learning.  The 
result is a full relational structure encoding bigger-than (bear, fox).  !
Simulations	

In this section we describe a series of simulations 
demonstrating DORA’s ability to account for a range of 
empirical phenomena.  Table 2 summarizes a set of core 
empirical phenomena that we take to be well enough 
established that a theory of the development of relation-
al concepts must be able to account for them.   
This section is organized as follows:  First, we 
present a set of basic simulations demonstrating 
DORA’s ability to learn simple structured relational 
representations from unstructured holistic inputs.  We 
demonstrate that the resulting representations meet the 
joint requirements of structure sensitivity and semantic 
richness (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997) by demonstrating 
that they allow DORA to make relational analogies. 
Following this basic demonstration, we use DORA to 
simulate each of the major empirical phenomena sum-
marized in Table 2.  !
Basic Demonstration: Learning a Relational Concept 
from Examples and Evaluating the Resulting Represen-
tations 
People acquire relational concepts from examples 
(Phenomena 1 and 2).  Beginning with representations 
that are holistic (Phenomenon 3) children gradually 
learn relational representations that are both structure 
sensitive and semantically rich (Phenomenon 4).  Here 
we present a series of simulations in which DORA 
learns relations from examples (e.g., DORA learns the 
relation bigger-than (x, y) from objects of different 
sizes).  We then test whether the resulting representa-
tions meet the requirements of structure sensitivity and  !
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Table 2. 
Phenomena Associated With Relation Discovery 
General phenomena 
1. People acquire relational concepts. 
2. The ability to reason relationally develops. 
3. Younger children’s representations are holistic. 
4. Older children and adult relational representations are both structure sensitive and semantically rich. 
5. Relational concepts can be learned from interleaved examples.   
6. The types of problems a reasoner can solve and the properties of the solutions depend critically on what the reasoner 
can and does represent. 
7. Children go through a domain-specific relational shift, in which they transition from representing a domain in terms 
of its characteristic features to representing it in terms of its characteristic relations (for most domains generally 
around 4-5 years of age). !
Specific phenomena 
8. Children’s relational and dimensional representations are initially holistic and tied to specific object values. 
9. Over time children’s relational and dimensional representations become progressively more abstract.   
10. Children’s initial relational representations are categorical rather than relative. 
11. The trajectory of children’s appreciation of similarity develops from appreciation of over-all identicality, to apprecia-
tion of shared properties, to appreciation of shared relations. 
12. Increased knowledge leads to more successful analogical performance.   
13. Comparison helps children learn structured representations.   
14. Progressively-aligned training assists in discovering relational similarities. 
15. Relational learning occurs without explicit feedback.     
16. Comparison helps adults learn relational rules. !!
semantic richness by using them to simulate some fun-
damental aspects of human relational reasoning (viz., 
the ability to solve cross-mappings, the ability to map 
non-identical but semantically similar relations, and the 
ability to violate the n-ary restriction; see Hummel & 
Holyoak, 1997).  The purpose of these simulations is to 
provide a basic test of DORA’s ability to learn struc-
tured relational representations from unstructured ex-
amples.  !
Learning Relational Concepts from Examples	

Our initial simulation tested DORA’s ability to learn 
relational representations from unstructured representa-
tions of objects.  DORA started with nothing but repre-
sentations of individual objects of various sizes.  By 
applying its predication and comparison routines, it first 
learned to represent specific sizes as explicit (initially 
“dirty”) predicates, then learned progressively more 
refined size predicates, then combined these predicates 
into value-specific representations of bigger-than, and 
finally compared these predicates to learn value-inde-
pendent representation of bigger-than.   
We ran two versions of these basic simulations.  We 
ran the "perception" version as though DORA were 
comparing pairs or collections of objects it was "looking 
at".  Thus, on each simulation, we gave it two or more 
objects to compare and allowed it to run its routines in 
the order described above.  The advantage of this ap-
proach is that it gave us control over the comparisons 
DORA made.  The disadvantage is that it required us to 
"tell" DORA which comparisons to make on each simu-
lation, and thus effectively, which of its operations to 
run in what order.   
In the "memory" version of the simulations, we ran-
domly chose one or more objects for DORA to "look at" 
(i.e., we randomly activated objects, objects with prop-
erties predicated about them, or pairs of objects with 
properties or relations predicated about them) and al-
lowed it to retrieve an object or objects from LTM to 
compare to the presented object(s).  The advantage of 
the “memory” procedure is that it does not require us to 
tell DORA which comparisons to make, or which opera-
tions to perform in what order.  Whereas the “percep-
tion” simulations entail a degree of hand-holding on the 
part of the modeler, the “memory” simulations allow us 
to observe DORA acting as an autonomous agent. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that it provides less 
control over the comparisons DORA makes and thus 
makes it more difficult to analyze the model's behavior. 
As detailed below, the model's performance was qualita-
tively very similar in both sets of simulations except 
that, not surprisingly, it required more comparisons to 
arrive at "clean" representations of bigger-than in the 
“memory” simulations than in the "perception" simula-
tions.  We assume that a child's experience is some 
combination of these approaches, with some compar-
isons resulting from the child viewing multiple objects 
simultaneously, and others resulting from the child be-
ing reminded of a comparison object by virtue of expe-
riencing a similar object.  
In both the “perception” and “memory” versions of 
the simulations, DORA started with objects.  Each ob-
ject was connected to two semantic units describing its 
size—specifically, “size” plus one specifying its specific 
size, e.g., “size-5”—plus eight other semantic units ran-
domly chosen from a pool of 150 (see Appendix B for 
details).  
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For the purposes of analyzing DORA’s developing 
representations, we defined a selectivity metric (SM), 
which quantifies the degree to which a PO is selective 
for the semantics specifying the property or relation 
deemed relevant in the simulation (in this case, seman-
tics for size and relative size).  For predicates represent-
ing single-place attributes (such as specific sizes), the 
SM for unit i was calculated as the mean connection 
weight between i and all the relevant semantics to which 
it was connected, j, normalized by the mean connection 
weight between i and all the irrelevant semantics to 
which it was connected, k: 
                           (7) 
!
One is added to the denominator to keep the SM ratio 
between 0 and 1: As the weights on a PO’s connections 
to relevant semantics approach 1, and the weights on its 
connections to irrelevant semantics approach 0, its SM 
approaches 1.  For multi-place relations (such as bigger-
than), the SM of the relation as a whole was calculated 
simply as the mean SM of the POs representing its 
roles.   
For the purposes of the SM, we designated the size-
related semantic units to be “relevant” (i.e., “size”, 
“more” and “less” were relevant for the learning of big-
ger-than as a relation) and all the other semantics to be 
“irrelevant.”  However, it is important to stress that this 
designation of “relevant” and “irrelevant” semantics—
as well as the naming of semantics as “size”, “more” 
etc.—are only for the purpose of analyzing the model’s 
behavior and for clarity of presentation.  As noted pre-
viously, we make no claims about the actual semantic 
content of the concepts of size or relative size.  Indeed, 
the details of that content, and the names of the seman-
tic units, do not matter to DORA. 
“Perception” simulations. In the “perception” 
simulations, DORA started with 160 (80 pairs of) ob-
jects constructed as described above.  We first allowed 
DORA to compare objects of similar sizes and learn 
new predicates via comparison-based predication (as 
described above).  Each object was randomly paired 
with another object of the same size.  For example, 
DORA might compare object5 (with features “size”, 
“size-2”, “sweet”, “round”, “red”, “fruit”, etc.) to objec-
t37 (with features “size”, “size-2”, “alive”, “green”, 
“reptilian”, etc.), resulting in a predicate connected 
strongly to semantics the two items had in common 
(here “size” and “size-2”) and weakly connected to the 
semantics connected to only one of the objects. 
DORA’s predication algorithm then bound this new 
predicate to the objects from which it was discovered 
(recall Figure 5), producing the proposition size-2 (ob-
ject37).  We ran this comparison process on 80 pairs of 
objects, resulting in 80 predicates coding for various 
object sizes, each bound to a specific object (i.e., the 
object in the recipient as per comparison-based predica-
tion).  However, the resulting size predicates were com-
paratively “dirty” (i.e., still largely connected to the 
irrelevant—i.e., non-size-related—features of the ob-
jects from which they were predicated) with a mean 
selectivity of 0.33; see Table 3.  We then let DORA 
compare these “dirty” predicate representations and 
refine them as described above.  Each of the 80 predi-
cate-object bindings DORA learned during the previous 
simulation was randomly paired with another predicate-
object binding describing the same size.  Each pair was 
then compared and refined.  For example, DORA might 
compare the role-binding size-2 (object7) to size-2 (ob-
ject37), resulting in a more-refined representation of 
size-2.  The resulting representations had higher selec-
tivity than the previous representations (0.40 vs. 0.33; 
Table 3, Row 3 vs. 2), indicating that successive com-
parisons allow DORA to learn progressively more selec-
tive representations of object attributes.  
Once DORA had learned more selective predicates 
for specific sizes, we allowed it to compare them by 
placing pairs of predicate-object bindings in the driver 
at the same time and invoking the comparator (as de-
scribed above).  For example, to compare size-5 (objec-
t1) to size-8 (object2), size-5 fires, followed by object1, 
followed by size-8, followed by object2, and the seman-
tic patterns generated by size-5 and size-8 are passed to 
the comparator as input.  As output, the comparator ac-
tivates “less” in synchrony with size-5 and “more” in 
synchrony with size-8.  The PO representing size-5 then 
learns a connection to the semantic “less” (by Eq. 6) and 
the PO for size-8 learns a connection to “more”.  The 
resulting POs represent, respectively, “size 5 and less 
size than something” and “size 8 and more size than 
something”.   During the previous simulation DORA 4
learned 40 refined predicates each bound to an object. 
We paired each of these refined predicates-object bind-
ings with a second predicate-object binding representing 
a different size.  For example, size-3 (object1) might be 
paired with size-7 (object2), producing 20 pairs of pred-
icate-object bindings that DORA ran through the com-
parator.   
Once the pairs of predicate-object bindings had been 
run through the comparator, DORA formed multi-place 
relational structures by comparing pairs of predicate-
object bindings to other pairs.  Each of the 20 pairs of 
predicate-object bindings that had been run through the 
comparator was randomly matched with another.  For 
example, the predicate-object pair size-7+more (object1) 
Table 3.   
SMi =
MEAN wij( )
1+ MEAN wik( )
.
 Recall that we are not making claims about how the relevant semantics are detected, only about how, once they are detected, 4
they can be isolated and represented explicitly.  While the comparator makes the relevant semantics active in the system, it is the 
predication and refinement routines that serve to organize these semantics into explicit structured relational representations.
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Mean attribute and relation selectivity (see text) of the representations that resulted from each comparison during “percep-
tion” simulation.  Dashes indicate undefined values.   
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and size-3+less (object2) might be matched with 
size-6+more (object3) and size-2+less (object4).  One 
pair was placed in the driver and the other in the recipi-
ent and DORA mapped them.  Each time DORA 
mapped one pair of predicate-object bindings to another, 
it invoked its relation discovery routine, inferring a P 
unitconjoining the predicate-object pairs in the recipi-
ent.  That is, DORA learned explicit, two-place repre-
sentations of the relation bigger-than.  For example, if it 
mapped size-7+more (object1) and size-3+less (object2) 
in the driver to size-6+more (object3) and size-2+less 
(object4) in the recipient, then it would learn a P unit 
binding size-6+more (object3) to size-2+less (object4), 
forming an explicit, albeit value-specific, representation 
of the relation bigger-than (object3, object4) (with size-
6+more as one role of the relation and size-2+less as the 
other).  We ran 10 such comparisons, resulting in 10 
new representations of the bigger-than relation.  At this 
point, because DORA had representations of multi-ar-
gument relations, relational selectivity could be calcu-
lated.  As shown in Table 3 row 5, these first relational 
representations are quite value-specific: Instead of rep-
resenting “bigger than” as an abstract relation, DORA’s 
first relational representations correspond to concepts 
such as “size 8 bigger than size 5”.   
Next, we had DORA compare sets of the relations it 
had learned in the previous simulation, and refine them 
via its predicate refinement routine.  The 10 representa-
tions of the bigger-than relation that DORA had learned 
during the previous portion of the simulation were ran-
domly paired (creating five pairs of relations).  DORA 
then compared each pair of bigger-than relations.  The 
resulting representations had greater relational selectivi-
ty than DORA’s first relational representations, indicat-
ing that the model was learning more idealized (i.e., 
value-independent) representations of the relations (.85 
vs. .71; see Table 3 row 6).  Applied iteratively, this al-
gorithm allows DORA to learn progressively less value-
laden representations.  For example, one more iteration 
through the learning algorithm produced representations 
with selectivity scores of .91 (Table 3 row 7).  This re-
finement takes place because each successive compari-
son reduces connection weights to features not shared 
by the relations (i.e., irrelevant semantics) by half, while 
weights to relevant semantics (i.e., the relational invari-
ants) remain at 1.   
In summary, these “perceptual” simulations demon-
strated that, beginning only with holistic representations 
of objects of various sizes, DORA can, by comparing 
these objects to one another, predicate the size attribute 
in an object-dependent fashion.  By comparing these 
predicates to one another, the model progressively re-
fines its representations of various sizes.  And by com-
paring different sizes to one another (using the compara-
tor) and comparing pairs of different-sized objects to 
one another, DORA discovers, and gradually refines, the 
bigger-than relation.  Moreover, in this simulation 
DORA learned representations of bigger-than with a 
very high SM with only 5 comparisons, demonstrating 
that DORA can learn value-independent multi-place 
relational representations with only a few comparisons. 
In short, these basic simulations demonstrate that 
DORA’s comparison, intersection discovery, predication 
and relation formation operations can work together to 
learn relational concepts from examples.   
“Memory” simulations. Although they pro-
vide a proof of concept, the “perceptual” simulations 
can be criticized on the grounds that we told DORA 
which comparisons to make—and thus, effectively, 
which operations to run—in what order.  We next ran 
the “memory” version of the same simulations to deter-
mine whether the routines DORA uses to discover pred-
icates and relations would produce analogous results 
without such explicit hand-holding on the part of the 
modeler.   
For these simulations, DORA started with 50 holistic 
representations of objects, constructed exactly as in the 
previous simulations.  On each simulation we randomly 
chose a structure from the collection in its LTM.  We 
then activated the randomly chosen structure in the dri-
ver (as though DORA was “looking at” or “noticing” 
the activated structure).  We allowed DORA to run from 
there.  Following its order of operations, DORA used 
the representation in the driver to retrieve representa-
tions into the recipient, then mapped the representation 
in its driver to those in its recipient, and then attempted 
to learn from the results (i.e., to perform comparison-
based learning, relation formation, and refinement, as 
described in the Order of Operations section above).  As 
in the previous simulation, DORA invoked the compari-
tor circuit when multiple predicates describing values 
along the same dimension (e.g., size, color, etc.) were 
Attribute 
selectivity
Relation 
selectivity
Initial state:  holistic object representations -- --
Compare objects to objects.  Result: explicit predicates 0.33 --
Compare pairs of predicates.  Result: refined predicates 0.4 --
Run comparator. Result: Values of “more” and “less” 0.71  --
Compare sets of predicate-object bindings.  Result: relations 0.71 0.71
Compare pairs of relations.  Result: refined relations 0.85 0.85
Compare pairs of relations again.  Result: refined relations 0.91 0.91
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active simultaneously.  In other words, rather than 
“telling” DORA what to compare to what, we allowed it 
to make comparisons on its own.   
As DORA runs its comparison and predication rou-
tines, the number of structures in its LTM grows, since 
each comparison/predication results in a new predicate-
object binding or, in the case of comparing sets of pred-
icate-object bindings, a new relation.  We suggest that 
the same is true of a child, for whom not only every new 
experience results in a new structure in LTM, but every 
comparison of a new experience with an old experience 
may likewise result in a new structure in LTM.  Howev-
er, a child’s experiences are unlikely to all be equally 
salient.  More recent events are likely to be more fre-
quently thought about and more commonly retrieved 
than older events (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913; Thorndike, 
1914).  We incorporated this fact in our “memory” sim-
ulations in a simplified manner in order to minimize the 
assumptions embodied therein.   We manipulated the 5
probability that DORA would notice a particular kind of 
thing (i.e., that an item from LTM would be activated in 
the driver) as a function of how recently it had been 
learned.  DORA would notice an item learned during the 
previous 50 simulations with a probability of .75, and it 
would notice an older item with a probability of .25. 
Similarly, during retrieval DORA was more likely to 
retrieve recently learned items into the recipient (proba-
bility .75 vs. ,25).  In addition, because during this sim-
ulation DORA could compare items of the same size 
and thus learn the same-size relation, the “same” seman-
tic was included as a relevant semantic for the purposes 
of calculating SM.   
After every 50 simulations we tested the SM of the 
representations DORA learned during those 50 simula-
tions.  These data are presented in Table 4.  Beginning 
with holistic representations of objects, DORA first 
learned single-place predicates and subsequently multi-
place relations (bigger-than, and same-size) that became 
progressively more refined with subsequent compar-
isons.  The “memory” simulation demonstrates that 
DORA’s routines for retrieval, mapping, and learning 
allow it to discover and predicate structured relational 
concepts from examples without being told which com-
parisons to make.  Importantly, allowing DORA to run 
on a set of examples produces the same trajectory ob-
served during the “perception” simulation described 
previously: DORA progresses from holistic objects, to 
“dirty” single-place predicates, to progressively more 
refined predicates and “dirty” relations, to progressively 
more refined relations. Finally, it is important to note 
that during the memory simulation DORA learned val-
ue-independent multi-place relations with only a few 
comparisons per relation.  During the 300 comparisons 
DORA learned 50 value independent multi-place rela-
tions (with SM = .92; see Table 4).  In other words, each 
value independent multi-place relation took an average 
of 6 comparisons to learn. 
Learning multiple relations from interleaved exam-
ples.  For simplicity and clarity, most of the simulations 
reported in this paper were run in a “blocked” fashion, 
in the sense that DORA was charged with learning only 
a single relational concept at a time.  Although children 
experience blocked practice with some concepts (e.g., at 
school, or with their parents), it is generally not the case 
that children go around the world mastering one concept 
(e.g., “red” or “bigger-than”) before moving on to the 
next (Phenomenon 5).  It is therefore important to know 
whether DORA, like children, can discover relational 
concepts when different kinds of examples are presented 
in an interleaved fashion.  From a technical perspective, 
it important to know whether DORA’s learning algo-
rithm will suffer catastrophic interference (e.g., of the 
type suffered under some conditions by models trained 
using error back-propagation; see McClosky & Cohen, 
1989) when its examples are presented in interleaved 
fashion.  If it does, then this interference would be an 
extremely important—even devastating—limitation of 
the model’s learning algorithm.   
To test the model’s ability to learn relational con-
cepts in an interleaved fashion, we gave it 100 objects 
whose features presented examples of four different 
concepts, namely: size (from which DORA learned big-
ger-than and same-size), width (from which DORA 
leaned wider-than and same-width), height (from which 
DORA learned higher-than and same-height), and color 
(from which DORA learned same- and different-color).   
These objects were created as in the previous simu-
lations with the single difference that each object was 
attached at random to one dimension—size, width, 
height, or color—and with a probability of .25 to every 
other dimension.  No object served as an example of 
every concept, but most objects served as examples of 
more than one.  We then ran the model in the same way 
as the previous “memory” simulation (see Appendix B). 
Armed with its repertoire of holistic objects, we ran-
domly activated objects (or, later, role-object bindings, 
pairs of role-object bindings or whole relations), and let 
DORA run.  As in the previous “memory” simulation 
we manipulated the probability that DORA would “no-
tice” a particular kind of thing as a function of how re-
cently it had been learned (p = .75 for an item learned 
during the previous 100 simulations and p = .25 for an 
older item).  Similarly, during retrieval DORA was more 
likely to retrieve recently learned items into the recipi-
ent (again, p = .75 and p = .25).  During this simulation 
DORA could compare items of the same size, width, 
height or color, so the “same” semantic was included as  
Table 4.   
 It is important to note that the model’s behavior is robust to violations in this assumption.  Without this assumption the model 5
follows exactly the same learning trajectory, it simply requires more iterations.  
A theory of the discovery and predication of relational concepts !21
Mean attribute and relation selectivity (see text) of the 50 representations that resulted from each set of 50 comparisons dur-
ing single-concept “memory” simulation.  Dashes indicate undefined values.   
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Table 5.   
Mean attribute and relation selectivity (see text) of the 100 representations that resulted from each set of 100 comparisons 
during multiple-concept “memory” simulation.  Dashes indicate undefined values.   
!
a relevant semantic for the purposes of calculating SM. 
After every 100 simulations we tested the SM of the 
representations DORA learned during those simulations. 
These data are presented in Table 5.  As in the previous 
simulations, beginning with holistic representations of 
objects DORA first learned single-place predicates and 
subsequently whole multi-place relations that became 
progressively more refined with subsequent compar-
isons.  
These simulation results illustrate four very impor-
tant points.  First, DORA learns relational structures 
from interleaved examples (i.e., from training that more 
accurately reflects real world experience). In other 
words, DORA does not suffer catastrophic interference 
when it learns multiple concepts simultaneously.  Sec-
ond, DORA can learn value independent representations 
of multi-place relations from objects that are involved in 
multiple relations simultaneously.  That is, DORA can 
learn a relation like above from examples of objects that 
are involved in the above relation as well as others. 
DORA’s learning routines isolate the features that define 
a specific relation (such as above) and learn explicit 
representations of that relation, even in the presence of 
competing relational features.  Third, the same learning 
trajectory observed during the previous “perception” 
and “memory” simulations is observed when DORA 
learns multiple concepts simultaneously from inter-
leaved examples: DORA progressed from holistic ob-
jects, to “dirty” single-place predicates, to progressively 
more refined predicates and “dirty” relations, to pro-
gressively more refined relations.  The interleaved simu-
lation (as well as those reported above) demonstrates 
that this trajectory is a fundamental consequence of 
DORA’s learning algorithm, rather than an artifact of 
the manner in which we ran any particular simulation. 
And fourth, even when learning from interleaved exam-
ples, DORA learned value-independent multi-place rela-
tions with only a few comparisons.  During the 600 
comparisons DORA learned 100 value independent 
multi-place relations (with mean SM = .93; see Table 5), 
indicating that each value independent multi-place rela-
tion took an average of 6 comparisons to learn.  This 
result demonstrates that DORA’s learning algorithm 
scales well in that it requires only a few comparisons to 
learn value-independent multi-placed relations, even 
when it is learning many relations concurrently.   
We now turn our attention to the question of whether 
the representations DORA learns are genuinely relation-
al, in the sense of supporting the basic operations neces-
sary for relational reasoning (such as analogical map-
ping).  !
Evaluating the resulting representations	

The simulations reported in this section tested 
whether the relations DORA learned in the previous 
simulations satisfy the structure sensitivity and semantic 
richness necessary to account for key aspects of rela-
tional reasoning (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; see also 
Doumas & Hummel, 2005).  
A stringent test of the structure sensitivity of a repre-
sentation is its ability to support finding correct rela-
tional mappings in the face of object cross-mappings.  A 
cross-mapping occurs when an object is mapped to a 
featurally less similar object rather than a featurally 
more similar object (because it shares a relational role 
Attribute selectivity Relation selectivity
Initial state:  holistic object representations -- --
50 Simulations 0.33 --
100 Simulations 0.63 0.63
150 Simulations 0.74 0.76
200 Simulations 0.8 0.81
250 Simulations 0.87 0.88
300 Simulations 0.91 0.92
Attribute selectivity Relation selectivity
Initial state:  holistic object representations -- --
100 Simulations 0.32 --
200 Simulations 0.58 0.61
300 Simulations 0.72 0.74
400 Simulations 0.83 0.85
500 Simulations 0.89 0.9
600 Simulations 0.92 0.93
A theory of the discovery and predication of relational concepts !22
with the less similar object).  For example, if dog1 is 
chasing cat1 and cat2 is chasing dog2, then the correct 
mapping places dog1 into correspondence with cat2. 
The ability to find such a mapping is taken as a hall-
mark of genuinely relational (i.e., as opposed to feature-
based) processing (see, e.g., Gentner, 2003; Markman & 
Gentner, 1993; Halford et al., 1998; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 1997).   
To test the bigger-than relations DORA learned in 
the previous simulations for their ability to support find-
ing cross-mappings, we selected two of those relations 
at random and bound them to new objects, creating two 
new propositions, P1 and P2.  The agent of P1 was se-
mantically identical to the patient of P2 and patient of 
P1 was identical to the agent of P2.  Specifically, P1 
was bigger-than1 (dog, cat) and P2 was bigger-than2 
(cat, dog).  We let DORA map P1 onto P2 and observed 
whether it mapped the cat in P1 onto the dog in P2 (the 
correct relational mapping) or the cat.  We repeated this 
procedure 10 times (each time with a different random-
ly-chosen pair of relations), and each time, DORA suc-
cessfully mapped the cat in P1 to the dog in P2 and 
vice-versa.  These results demonstrate that the relations 
DORA learned in the first series of simulations satisfy 
the requirement of structural sensitivity.   
As a test of the semantic-richness of DORA’s 
learned relations, we tested its ability to map those rela-
tions to similar but non-identical relations (such as 
greater-than).  People can successfully map such rela-
tions (e.g., Bassok, Wu, & Olseth, 1995; Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Kubose, Holyoak, & Hummel, 
2002), an ability that Hummel and Holyoak (1997, 
2003), Doumas and Hummel (2004a) and others have 
argued depends on the semantic-richness of our rela-
tional representations.   
To test DORA’s ability to map non-identical predi-
cates we had it map a new relation (R2) to one of its 
learned bigger-than relations (R1, randomly chosen). 
R2 was constructed to share 50% of its semantics (in 
each role) with R1.  To assure that DORA could not 
“cheat” by mapping based on object similarity, the ob-
jects that served as arguments to the corresponding roles 
of R1 and R2 were constrained to have no semantic 
overlap.  We repeated this procedure 10 times.  Each 
time, DORA mapped the agent role of R1 to the agent 
role of R2 and the patient role of R1 to the patient role 
of R2; corresponding objects also always mapped to one 
another (by virtue of their bindings to corresponding 
roles) in spite of their lack of semantic overlap.   
Finally, as the most stringent test of the structure 
sensitivity and semantic richness of DORA’s learned 
relations, we tested the model’s ability to find mappings 
that violate the n-ary restriction: the restriction that an 
n-place predicate may not map to an m-place predicate 
when n ≠ m.  The n-ary restriction applies to most mod-
els of analogical mapping (namely, those that represent 
propositions using traditional propositional notation and 
its isomorphs; see Doumas & Hummel, 2004a, 2005) 
but does not apply to human analogical reasoning, as 
evidenced by our ability to find the correct role and ob-
ject correspondences between taller (Bill, Dave) on the 
one hand and short (Fred), tall (James), on the other 
(Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).   
To test DORA’s ability to find such mappings, we 
ran a simulation in which DORA mapped one of its 
learned bigger-than relations (R1, randomly chosen) to 
a single place predicate (r2) that shared 50% of its se-
mantics with the agent role of R1 and none of its seman-
tics with the patient role.  The object bound to r2 shared 
half of its semantics with the object in the agent role of 
R1 and the other half with the object in the patient role 
of R1.  We ran this simulation 10 times, and each time 
DORA successfully mapped the agent role of R1 to r2, 
along with their arguments.  We then ran the same simu-
lation 10 more times, only on these simulations, r2 
shared half its semantic content with the patient (rather 
than agent) role of R1.  DORA successfully mapped the 
patient role of R1 to r2 (along with their arguments) on 
each run.  In all these simulations, DORA overcame the 
n-ary restriction, mapping the single-place predicate r2 
onto the most similar relational role of R1.   
In summary, the basic simulations reported so far 
demonstrate that, starting with unstructured representa-
tions of object features, DORA learns relational repre-
sentations, such as bigger-than (x, y), that meet the joint 
requirements of structure sensitivity and semantic rich-
ness.  That is, DORA learns representations of relational 
concepts that support human-like relational reasoning. 
The simulations thus demonstrate that the representa-
tions and processes embodied in DORA can provide at 
least the beginnings of an account of the discovery and 
predication of relational concepts.  In the next sections, 
we demonstrate that DORA can also account for several 
specific empirical findings in the literature on the acqui-
sition of relational concepts in adults and children. !
The relational shift 
The kinds of problems a reasoner can solve depend 
critically on the content and form of his or her mental 
representations (Phenomenon 6; see Doumas & Hum-
mel, 2005 for a review).  For example, children go 
through a domain-specific relational shift in which they 
transition from representing a domain in terms of its 
characteristic features to representing it in terms of its 
characteristic relations as well (Phenomenon 7; see e.g., 
Gentner, 2003; Gentner & Rattermann, 1991).  Early on 
children tend to appreciate similarity on a very global 
level (e.g., Chen, Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997; Oakes & 
Cohen, 1990; Smith, 1989).  However, as they develop 
they begin to appreciate kinds of similarity.  For exam-
ple, they can appreciate that two items are similar be-
cause they are the same color even though they have 
different shapes (e.g., Smith, 1984), or that a situation in 
which a dog chases a cat is similar to a situation in 
which a police officer chases a criminal (e.g., Gentner & 
Rattermann, 1991; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998).   Im-
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portantly, this relational shift is domain-specific, in the 
sense that it may occur at different times for different 
domains of knowledge (Gentner & Ratterman, 1991). 
The domain-specific nature of the relational shift has 
prompted Gentner and her colleagues (e.g., Gentner, 
1988, 2003; Gentner & Rattermann, 1991; Rattermann 
& Gentner, 1998) to argue that the relational shift re-
flects a qualitative change in children’s mental represen-
tations.  Children’s initial representations support the 
appreciation of over-all similarity (see also Smith, 
1989), but as they grow older they learn more abstract 
representations that support reasoning based on specific 
properties and relations.  The relational shift is an ex-
ample of the manner in which a person’s knowledge 
representations can affect their reasoning. This account 
of the relational shift, although very likely correct in our 
view, is nonetheless incomplete in that it does not pro-
vide an account of how this change takes place: What 
kinds of operations, at an algorithmic level, allow a 
child to make the transition from early holistic represen-
tations to progressively more relational representations 
that eventually support adult-like relational reasoning?   
As demonstrated by the simulations presented in the 
previous section, DORA provides a systematic and de-
tailed account of how this change in the quality of rep-
resentations progresses.  Moreover, as in the relational 
shift, DORA’s representations progress in a domain-
specific fashion.  DORA’s progression thus corresponds 
in a very intuitive way to the relational shift as a general 
phenomenon.  As demonstrated in the following sec-
tions, the model also provides a natural account of many 
phenomena cited as examples of, or are otherwise relat-
ed to, the relational shift. 
Children’s early relational representations 
Phenomena 8, 9 and 10 describe patterns in chil-
dren’s development of relational concepts.  Early in 
development, our relational concepts are holistic and 
object-based (i.e., tied to specific object values; Phe-
nomenon 8) and over time gradually become more ab-
stract (Phenomenon 9; e.g., Chen, Sanchez, & Camp-
bell, 1997; Gentner, 2003; Gentner & Medina, 1998; 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Landau, Smith, & Jones, 
1988; Markman & Gentner, 1993; Rovee-Collier & Fa-
gen, 1981; Smith, 1989; Smith, Rattermann, & Sera, 
1988; Quinn et al., 1996).  As a result, our early rela-
tional representations often appear more categorical 
(i.e., category-like) than relational (Phenomenon 10). 
For example, children use bigger to describe categori-
cally big objects rather than objects that play the agent 
role in the bigger-than relation.   
The trajectory from categorical to relational repre-
sentations was demonstrated by Smith et al. (1988), 
Experiment 1.  The experimenters tested children’s abil-
ity to reason about relations between objects.  Children 
ages 4-5 viewed pairs of toy butterflies at three different 
sets of heights:  (1) One butterfly at five and the other at 
six feet above the floor (both butterflies were high); (2) 
one butterfly at three the other at four feet (both butter-
flies were at a medium height); (3) one butterfly at one 
foot the other at two feet (both butterflies were low).  As 
the children viewed each set they were asked whether 
one of the two butterflies was higher (or lower) and if so 
which one.  There were three trial types.  On consistent 
trials both butterflies were high (or low) and the child 
was asked which butterfly was higher (or lower).  On 
neutral trials both butterflies were in the middle and the 
child was either asked whether one was higher or lower. 
On inconsistent trials both butterflies were high (or low) 
and the child was asked which butterfly was lower (or 
higher).  The experimenters found that while 4-year-olds 
performed well on consistent trials and above chance on 
neutral trials, they were at chance for inconsistent trials. 
However, 5-year-olds performed well above chance on 
all three trial types (see Figure 9).   
As noted by Smith et al. (1988), these results sug-
gest that the 4-year-olds were treating relations like cat-
egories: They treated higher like a category referring to 
high things and lower like a category referring to low 
things (i.e., only high things could be higher and only 
low things could be lower).  However, by age 5, they 
understood higher and lower as relational concepts that 
could be true regardless of the absolute heights of the 
objects involved.   
We simulated Smith et al. (1988) Experiment 1 in 
two interleaved parts.  In the first, we simulated the de-
velopment of the higher-than relation.  This simulation 
progressed in the same way as our basic simulation of 
relation discovery reported above (“Perception” simu-
lations), except that (a) “height” (and specific heights 
from 1 to 10) replaced “size” (and specific sizes), and 
(b) we attached category-specific values to objects (e.g., 
“high” for objects with height 7-10, “low” for objects 
with height 1-3).  We let DORA make the same compar-
isons described in the basic simulations section.   
The results of this part of the simulation were the 
same as the results of the relation discovery simulation 
reported above.  As before, DORA first learned single-
place representations of specific heights, which it re-
fined through its initial comparisons.  Next it ran sets of 
these single-place predicate-filler sets describing differ-
ent heights through the comparator.  Subsequently it 
learned relations comprised of these single-place predi-
cate sets by comparing them to other single-place predi-
cate sets, producing value-dependent representations of 
the higher and lower relations.  Finally, DORA com-
pared its value-dependent relational representations, 
which produced value-independent representations of 
the higher and lower relations  (i.e., representations of 
higher and lower that were not attached strongly to spe-
cific heights or specific values such as “high” or “low”).   
It is important to emphasize that DORA’s learning 
trajectory—from categorical (i.e., context-bound) to 
more context-free representations of relations—is not 
simply a function of the manner in which we ran the 
simulations, but is instead an inevitable consequence of 
the manner in which the model learns relations from 
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examples: Beginning with representations of whole ob-
jects it learns representations of specific values of 
height.  From these it learns representations of higher 
and lower that are tied to specific heights or to specific 
categorical values (i.e., representations of higher that 
are also “high” and representations of lower that are 
also “low”).  And from these it finally learns representa-
tions of higher-than and lower-than that are independent 
of object features and context (i.e., that are relative 
rather than categorical): DORA necessarily learns the 
context-bound representations before it learns the con-
text-independent representations because it learns its 
context-independent representations by comparing sets 
of context-bound representations. 
The second part of the simulation was the simulation 
of the Smith et al. (1988) experiment.  Specifically, to 
simulate children of different ages, we ran the simula-
tions of the Smith et al. experiment at different times 
during DORA’s learning of the higher-than and lower-
than relations.  To simulate 4 year olds, we ran DORA 
when it had roughly three-times as many context-de-
pendent predicates as context-free predicates.  To simu-
late 5 year-olds, we ran DORA after it had acquired 
roughly the same number of context-free predicates as it 
had context-dependent predicates.  This procedure re-
flects our assumption that 5 years-olds have had more 
time to make the comparisons necessary to acquire con-
text-independent predicates than have 4 year-olds.  At 
both “ages” DORA also had roughly the same number 
of random propositions about butterflies as it had con-
text-dependent predicates in its LTM (see Appendix B 
for details). 
For each trial we placed a representation of the prob-
lem (i.e., the pair of butterflies placed in front of the 
child) in the driver.  The same representation of the 
problem was used to simulate both 4 and 5 year-olds. 
For all three trial types, the driver contained one propo-
sition specifying that one butterfly was higher than the 
other (i.e., higher-than (butterfly1, butterfly2)).  In addi-
tion, for the consistent and inconsistent trial types we 
included two additional propositions.  For trials on 
which both butterflies were high, we included the 
propositions high (butterfly1) and high (butterfly2); 
likewise, trials on which both were low included the 
propositions low (butterfly1) and low (butterfly2).  Neu-
tral trials, in which both butterflies were near the middle 
of the display, did not include these additional state-
ments.  
We tested the model by using the propositions in the 
driver to retrieve propositions from LTM.  Once a small 
number of propositions (approximately 3 or 4) had been 
retrieved from LTM into the recipient, DORA attempted 
to map the representation in its driver to the proposi-
tions in its recipient.  We selected the proposition from 
the recipient that mapped most strongly to a driver rep-
resentation as the model’s response. 
We ran 40 simulations of each of the six types of 
trials formed by crossing the two question types (“which 
is higher?” vs. “which is lower?”) with the three heights 
(high, medium and low) for each age group.  DORA’s 
performance across all runs is summarized in Figure 9. 
Just as the 4 year-olds in the Smith et al. study, DORA 
at “age 4” performed best on consistent trials and worst 
on inconsistent trials.  At “age 5” DORA, just like 5 
year-old children, had little difficulty with any of the 
conditions, and performed well above chance in all cas-
es.   !
The trajectory of the appreciation of similarity 
Phenomena 11 and 12 describe the development of 
children’s ability to appreciate the correspondences be-
tween situations (see Sera & Smith, 1987; Smith, 1984, 
1985, 1989; Smith & Sera, 1992).  Early in develop-
ment, children appreciate the overall similarity between 
objects.  Later, with increased knowledge, they can rea-
son about objects based on specific properties.  Finally, 
they can appreciate the similarity between sets of ob-
jects based on shared relations (Phenomenon 11).  This 
increasing relational knowledge leads to improved per-
formance making analogical mappings (Phenomenon 
12). !!
!
Figure 9.  Simulation data of Smith, Rattermann, & Sera, 1988.  !
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The trajectory of the appreciation of similarity 
Phenomena 11 and 12 describe the development of 
children’s ability to appreciate the correspondences be-
tween situations (see Sera & Smith, 1987; Smith, 1984, 
1985, 1989; Smith & Sera, 1992).  Early in develop-
ment, children appreciate the overall similarity between 
objects.  Later, with increased knowledge, they can rea-
son about objects based on specific properties.  Finally, 
they can appreciate the similarity between sets of ob-
jects based on shared relations (Phenomenon 11).  This 
increasing relational knowledge leads to improved per-
formance making analogical mappings (Phenomenon 
12). 
Smith (1984; Experiment 1) provides an example of 
this trajectory.  This experiment tested the abilities of 
children aged 2-4 to match items based on overall iden-
ticality, shared properties, and shared relations.  In the 
experiment, a child and two experimenters each had 
three items placed in front of them.  The experimenters 
selected items based on identicality (or over-all similari-
ty; e.g., the first experimenter selected a red house and 
the second experimenter selected a red house), a shared 
property (e.g., the first experimenter selected two red 
items, and the second experimenter selected two differ-
ent red items), or a shared relation (e.g., the first exper-
imenter selected two red items and the second experi-
menter selected two green items).  The child’s task was 
to select items from her pile that best matched the ex-
perimenters’ choices.  In the identicality condition, the 
child had to select the item that matched the items se-
lected by the two experimenters (e.g., a red house).  In 
the shared property condition, the child had to select 
two items with the same property as those chosen by the 
experimenter (e.g., two red items).  In the shared rela-
tion condition, the child had to select two items that 
matched the items chosen by the experimenters on the 
basis of a common relation (e.g., two blue items [out of, 
say, two blue items and a red item]).  In each condition 
there were distracter items that shared superficial simi-
larity with the other items in front of the child and the 
items chosen by the experimenters.  Thus, in order to 
perform correctly, the child had to ignore some similari-
ties and focus on others.  Smith found that the ability to 
appreciate more abstract kinds of similarity increased 
with age.  Although all the children could match items 
based on identicality, only 3 and 4 year-olds could con-
sistently match based on shared properties, and only 4 
year-olds consistently matched based on shared rela-
tions.   
DORA predicts this trajectory.  Beginning with 
holistic object representations DORA learns representa-
tions of object properties (i.e., single place predicates). 
It then concatenates sets of single-place predicates to 
form multi-place relational structures.  We simulated 
Smith (1984) Experiment 1 by allowing DORA to de-
velop representations and testing it at various points 
along its developmental trajectory.  Like the simulation 
of Smith et al. (1988), this simulation had two inter-
leaved parts: The development of representations, fol-
lowed by the use of those representations at each stage 
of their development.  Our goal was to observe whether 
the kinds of problems DORA can solve as its represen-
tations develop mirror the trend demonstrated by the 
children in Smith’s study. 
We ran the first part of the simulation—the devel-
opment of representations—just like our earlier basic 
simulations of relation discovery (“Perception” simula-
tions). The only difference was that, rather than seman-
tics describing size (or height), the objects DORA start-
ed with were connected to semantics of interest describ-
ing their color, specifically, the semantic “color”, and 
another semantic feature indicating the specific color of 
the object.  (As an aside, it is worth noting that many of 
the irrelevant semantics in these simulations described 
sizes and heights.  Thus, the real difference between the 
simulations is not which semantics the objects are as-
sumed to have attached to them; rather, it is only (a) 
which semantics are relevant to the task, and thus (b) 
which ones the objects are assumed to share.)  We used 
10 specific object colors (see Appendix B for details). 
We let DORA make exactly the same series of compar-
isons described in the basic simulations of relation dis-
covery.   
The results of this simulation were the same as the 
results of the previous relation discovery simulations. 
DORA first learned single-place representations of spe-
cific colors, which it refined through additional compar-
isons.  Next it ran sets of these single-place predicate 
sets describing the same color through the comparator, 
and then learned relations comprised of these single-
place predicate sets by comparing them to other single-
place predicate sets, producing value-dependent repre-
sentations of the same-color relation (i.e., same-color 
relations tied to specific color values).  Finally, DORA 
compared its value-dependent relational representations, 
which produced value-independent representations of 
the same-color relation  (i.e., representations of same-
color that were not strongly attached to specific color 
values).    
As before, this trajectory is not a function of the way 
we ran the specific simulations but rather is an in-
evitable consequence of the manner in which DORA 
learns relations: It must learn about specific colors be-
fore it can learn that two colors are the same, and it 
must learn that some colors are the same before it can 
abstract the relation same-color.   
The second part of the simulation tested whether the 
representational trajectory DORA predicts matches the 
developmental trajectory demonstrated by Smith (1984). 
To do so, we tested DORA at various stages of its repre-
sentational development during part 1 of the simulation. 
Specifically, to simulate 2 year-olds we tested DORA on 
Smith’s task after it had made its initial comparisons of 
whole objects (i.e., when it had representations of whole- 
Table 6. 
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Types of propositions and examples of these propositions used to simulate Smith (1984) Experiment 1.   
!!
objects and the “dirty” single-place predicates).  To 
simulate 3 year-olds we tested DORA after it had 
formed its initial relational representations (i.e., when it 
had “clean” single-place predicate representations and 
value-dependent relational representations).  Finally, to 
simulate 4 year-olds we tested DORA after it had re-
fined its relational representations (i.e., when it was first 
developing representations of value-independent rela-
tions).   
To simulate each trial of Smith’s experiment we 
placed a representation of the experimenters’ choices in 
the driver and a representation of the three objects in 
front of the child in the recipient.  Table 6 presents ex-
amples of the kinds of representations in DORA’s driver 
and recipient as a function of “age”.  All the representa-
tions used in this part of the simulation were representa-
tions DORA had learned during the first part of the sim-
ulation.  At “age 2” DORA had only learned “dirty” 
single-place predicates so it represented objects simply 
as objects for the identity trials (as this was sufficient to 
perform at ceiling), and as objects bound to “dirty” sin-
gle-place predicates describing a relevant property in 
the shared property and shared relation conditions (Ta-
ble 6 column 1).  At “age 3” DORA had learned “clean” 
single-place predicates and value-dependent relational 
representations so it represented the objects as whole 
objects for the identity trials, as objects bound to 
“clean” value-independent relations in the shared prop-
erty condition, and as objects bound to value-dependent 
relations in the shared relation condition (Table 6 col-
umn 2).  At “age 4” DORA had learned “clean” single-
place predicates and value-independent relations so it 
represented the objects as whole objects for the identity 
trials, and as objects bound to value-independent rela-
tions in the shared property condition and the shared 
relation condition (Table 6 column 3).  As in Smith 
(1984, Experiment 1), the proportion of relevant and 
distracter features was balanced across all trials (i.e., 
objects in the driver shared an equivalent proportion of 
superficial similarity, in the form of semantic features, 
with both the correct choice object [the object that they 
should match to based on the rule] and the distracter 
object; see Appendix B for details).   
We used DORA’s ability to map representations as a 
metric of its ability to match them: If DORA mapped an 
object in the driver to an object in the recipient it was 
judged to have matched them.  If DORA matched the 
objects in the driver to the objects in the recipient 
based on the trial rule, it was judged to have made a 
correct choice (e.g., in a shared relation trial it mapped 
the two objects in the driver to the two objects in the 
recipient with the same relation).  If DORA mapped 
Propostions DORA “age 2” DORA “age 3” DORA “age 4”
Identicality:  Driver: 	
!
Recipient:
Unbound objects	

P1:  (Ball1)	

Unbound objects	

P2:  (Ball3)	

P3:  (Ball4)	

P4:  (Ball5)
Unbound objects	

P1:  (Ball1)	

Unbound objects	

P2:  (Ball3)	

P3:  (Ball4)	

P4:  (Ball5)
Unbound objects	

P1:  (Ball1)	

Unbound objects	

P2:  (Ball3)	

P3:  (Ball4)	

P4:  (Ball5)
Shared Property:  Driver:  	
!!!
Recipient:
“Dirty” single-place predi-
cates	

P1:  red+size-2 (Ball1)	

P2:  red+size-4 (Ball2)	

“Dirty” single-place predi-
cates	

P3:  red+size-2 (Ball3)	

P4:  red+size-8 (Ball4)	

P5:  green+size-4 (Ball5)
Value-dependent relations	

P1:  same+color+red (Bal-
l1, Ball2)	
!
Value-dependent relations	

P2:  same+color+red (Bal-
l3, Ball4)	

P3:  same+size+size-5 
(Ball4, Ball5)
Value-independent rela-
tions	

P1:  same+color (Ball1, 
Ball2)	
!
Value-independent rela-
tions	

P2:  same+color (Ball3, 
Ball4)	

P3:  same+size (Ball4, 
Ball5)
Shared Relation:  Driver: 	
!
 	
!
Recipient:
“Dirty” single-place predi-
cates	

P1:  red+size-2 (Ball1)	

P2:  red+size-4 (Ball2)	

“Dirty” single-place predi-
cates	

P3:  green+size-2 (Ball3)	

P4:  green+size-8 (Ball4)	

P5:  red+size-4 (Ball5)
Value-dependent relations	

P1:  same+color+red (Bal-
l1, Ball2)	
!
Value-dependent relations	

P2:  same+color+green 
(Ball3, Ball4)	

P3: more+size+red+green 
(Ball3,Ball5)
Value-independent rela-
tions	

P1:  same+color (Ball1, 
Ball2)	
!
Value-independent rela-
tions	

P2:  same+color (Ball3, 
Ball4)	

P3:  more+size (Ball3,Bal-
l5)
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either of the objects in the driver to the distracter object 
in the recipient, it was judged to have made an incorrect 
choice.  If DORA failed to find any mappings, it simply 
chose a random pair (the probability of picking the cor-
rect pair at random is .33).  
Table 7. 
Probability of reaching criterion (greater-than or equal to 75% correct; 10 subjects/runs per age, 4 trials per condition per 
subject/run). 
!!
We ran 10 simulations of each age group.  Each 
simulation consisted of 12 trials, four of each type (i.e., 
identity, property, and shared relation; see Appendix B 
for details).  DORA’s performance on each type of prob-
lem at different stages of its representational develop-
ment is summarized in Table 7, along with the human 
data.  
As illustrated in Table 7, the qualitative correspon-
dence between DORA’s performance and the human 
data is very close.  With its initial whole object repre-
sentations, DORA, like the 2-year-olds in Smith (1984), 
could consistently match based on identicality.  That is, 
it could easily map an object in the driver to the most 
similar object in the recipient.  At “age 3”, after DORA 
had learned “clean” singe-place predicates, it could con-
sistently map sets of objects with similar colors predi-
cated about them.  For example, DORA would map red 
(ball) to red (house) because of the common red predi-
cates even though ball and house have very different 
features.  In fact, DORA would even map red (ball) to 
red (house) in the presence of another ball of a different 
color.  In short, DORA, like the 3 year-olds in Smith’s 
study, was able to appreciate the commonalities between 
items based on a shared attribute, even in the presence 
of distracter items.  Finally, once DORA at “age 4” had 
learned value-independent relational representations, 
like same-color, it could consistently match pairs of 
items based on those relations.  For instance, it would 
match same-color (ball1, ball2) to same-color (item1, 
item2) even in the presence of a distracter item.  !
Comparison and the development of concepts and rela-
tional representations 
Phenomena 13-16 highlight the importance of com-
parison in the development of conceptual and relational 
representations in children (e.g., Gentner, 2003; Gentner 
& Namy, 1999; Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996; Namy & 
Gentner, 2002; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998; Sloutsky, 
2003; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; Smith, 1989), and adults 
(e.g., Dixon & Bangart, 2004; Doumas & Hummel, 
2004b; Ross & Warren, 2002; Sandhofer & Smith, 
2001; Yamauchi & Markman, 1998, 2000).  In DORA, 
comparison bootstraps the discovery of relational con-
cepts.  As a result, it may be well suited to provide an 
account of the mechanisms that underlie comparison-
based learning in children.  !
Comparison and children’s learning	

Phenomenon 13 refers to the central role of compar-
ison in the formation of children’s concepts, as demon-
strated by many researchers and exemplified by a study 
by Gentner and Namy (1999).  Gentner and Namy test-
ed the effect of comparison on 4 year-old children’s 
ability to abstract conceptual and structural commonali-
ties from featurally dissimilar instances using a simple 
match-to-sample task.  In a match-to-sample task the 
subject is presented with a sample stimulus, and two test 
items.  Her task is to choose the test item that best 
matches the sample.  There were two conditions in Gen-
tner and Namy’s experiment.  In the No-Compare (NC) 
condition one of the test items was more perceptually 
similar to the sample and the other was a categorical 
match.  For example, if the sample was an apple, the test 
items might be a red ball (a perceptual match) and a 
banana (a categorical match).  As the authors expected, 
children in the NC condition more frequently chose the 
test item that was perceptually similar to the sample.   
However, in the Compare (C) condition, Gentner 
and Namy elicited comparison by presenting four sam-
ple items and two test items.  For example, the sample 
might consist of an apple, a pear, a watermelon, and a 
grape, with a ball and a banana as test items.  Here the 
children had the opportunity not only to compare the 
sample to the test items, but also to compare sample 
items to one another.  In this condition, although the 
ball, being round, is perceptually more similar to all of 
the sample items than is the banana, children over-
whelmingly selected the test item that matched the sam-
ple categorically (in this example, the banana).  Thus, 
comparison helped the children extract explicit repre-
sentations of the categorical information from items and 
use this information to find correspondences between 
them.   
In our simulation the sample and test items were 
generated to match the logic of Gentner and Namy’s 
stimuli.  Broadly, we generated the stimuli so that the 
perceptual match item was more similar to the sample 
item (or items) than was the conceptual match item, but 
Age 2 
Children, DORA
Age 3 
Children, DORA
Age 4 
Children, DORA
Identicality 1.0, 1.0 1.0, 1.0 1.0, 1.0
Shared Property 0.8, 0.7 0.9, 1.0 1.0, 1.0
Shared Relation 0.0, 0.1 0.7, 0.8 1.0, 1.0
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the conceptual match item and the sample item(s) did 
have at least one feature in common (i.e., at the very 
least they came from the same category; as in Gentner 
and Namy’s experiment).  To simulate the NC condition 
we placed a representation of the sample (as a PO unit) 
in the driver, and representations of the two test items 
(also as PO units) in the recipient.  Each test item was 
attached to 10 distinct semantic features (i.e., the test 
items had no semantic features in common).  The sam-
ple was attached to eight semantic units.  In order to 
ensure that the sample had at least one feature in com-
mon with each test item, one of the semantics attached 
to the sample item was a semantic that was also attached 
to the perceptual match item (chosen at random), and a 
second semantic attached to the sample item was a se-
mantic that was also attached to the perceptual match 
item (the categorical semantic).  The remaining six se-
mantics from the sample were chosen at random from a 
pool of 14.  This pool was constructed by selecting all 
nine of the remaining semantics attached to the percep-
tual match test item (i.e., the semantics not already con-
nected to the test item) and five of the nine remaining 
semantics (at random) that were attached to the categor-
ical match test item.  In this way we replicated the simi-
larity of the sample and test items from Gentner and 
Namy: The test item generally shared two-thirds of its 
features with the perceptual match and one-third with 
the categorical match, and the sample had at least two 
semantics in common with the perceptual match and 
one semantic in common with the conceptual match. 
On each trial DORA attempted to map the driver repre-
sentation (i.e., the sample) onto the recipient items (i.e., 
the test).  Whichever recipient item mapped most 
strongly to the driver item was selected as DORA’s 
choice on that trial. 
For the C condition, we constructed sample and test 
items exactly as described above with the constraint that 
all the sample items shared the same semantic (i.e., the 
category  label) with the categorical match item.  As a 
result, although the perceptual match was more similar 
to any individual sample item, there was at least one 
semantic unit common to all sample items and the con-
ceptual match, reflecting the underlying conceptual sim-
ilarity between all the sample items and the conceptual 
match.  Before mapping, we allowed DORA to make a 
set of comparisons.  First DORA selected two sample 
items at random, compared them, and predicated their 
common properties.  Then DORA compared the other 
two sample items and predicated their common proper-
ties (corresponding to Gentner and Namy’s assumption 
that the four sample items elicited comparison).  Finally, 
DORA compared the two new representations it had 
learned during the previous comparisons and refined 
them via intersection discovery.  These comparisons 
resulted in a PO connected most strongly to the seman-
tic (or semantics) shared by all the conceptual match 
items (the conceptual semantic; e.g., “fruit”).  DORA 
used this representation in the driver and the two test 
items in the recipient.  Because predicates and objects 
share the same semantic pool, when the new predicate 
representation in the driver fired, it excited (and, there-
fore, mapped to) the conceptual match item in the recip-
ient.  Again whichever recipient object mapped most 
strongly to the driver item was selected as DORA’s re-
sponse choice on that trial.   
We ran DORA for 20 simulations each consisting of 
five NC and five C trials.  The results are presented in 
Figure 10.  Just like the subjects in Gentner and Namy’s 
experiment, DORA overwhelming chose the categorical 
match item in the C condition, and chose the perceptual 
match more frequently in the NC condition.   !
!
Figure 10.  Simulation of Gentner and Namy (1999) data.  !
The role of progressive-alignment	

Phenomenon 14 refers to the effects of a training 
procedure, progressive alignment (e.g., Gentner, 2003; 
Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996), on concept acquisition. 
Under progressive alignment, subjects begin by compar-
ing highly similar examples of a concept and progres-
sively compare more distant examples.  This procedure 
is remarkable because it leads to relational learning 
without feedback (i.e., learning is incidental) and yields 
relational responding earlier (developmentally) and 
faster (during training) than when the examples are not 
progressively ordered.  For example, in Experiment 2 of 
Kotovsky and Gentner (1996), 4 and 6 year-old children 
were given the task of learning to solve relational 
match-to-sample problems as illustrated in Figure 11. 
In a relational match-to-sample, the correct test item 
matches the sample based on a shared relation.  For ex-
ample, the child might be shown a sample consisting of 
a series of circles increasing in size, along with two test 
items: a series of squares increasing in size or a set of 
unordered squares (Figure 11a).  The child’s task is to 
choose the test item that matches the sample.  This task 
is difficult for young children.  Even harder is the prob-
lem illustrated in Figure 11b, where the child must make 
a cross-dimensional match (e.g., matching increasing 
size to increasing darkness).   
Kotovsky and Gentner (1996) attempted to teach 
children to make these and related matches.  They had 
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little success at the younger ages when the instances 
were presented in a random order.  However, they had 
considerable success—even without providing children 
with any feedback (Phenomenon 15)—when the train-
ing sets were presented starting with very easy matches 
that could be solved by featural similarity alone, and 
then progressing slowly to more difficult relational 
matches.  Each child received 16 trials.  In the progres-
sively aligned condition, the first eight were same-di-
mension trials (Figure 11a) arranged so that the simplest 
matches (those that could be solved featurally) came 
first.  The last eight were cross-dimension trials (Figure 
11b).  Kotovsky and Gentner found that all the children 
who performed well (i.e., above chance) on the same-
dimension trials also performed well on the cross-di-
mension trials, and that all the children who performed 
poorly (i.e., at chance) on the same-dimension trials also 
performed poorly on the cross-dimension trials.  
!  
Figure 11.  Examples of stimuli used in Kotovsky and Gen-
tner (1996).  (a) Illustration of a same-dimensional match. 
The child must match two sets of shapes increasing in size. 
(b) Illustration of a cross-dimensional match.  The child 
must match a set of items increasing in size to a set of items 
increasing in darkness.  !
There are some remarkable facts about this phe-
nomenon: First, children discovered the relations inci-
dentally (i.e. without feedback), which is important be-
cause although children receive explicit training and 
instruction in some circumstances (e.g., in preschool) it 
seems likely that the majority of children’s learning 
takes place without feedback.  At the same time, the 
world is not an unstructured place.  Similar things often 
occur in similar contexts and in close temporal proximi-
ty.  In this sense, the systematic ordering of the progres-
sive alignment procedure may more closely mimic the 
real world than do the randomized stimulus presenta-
tions conventional in cognitive experiments.  Second, 
each training instance is similar to the next, which may 
directly facilitate the comparison process.  Third, the 
early correlation between similarity-based matches and 
relational matches promoted the discovery of the rela-
tion and its subsequent application without similarity 
support.  This effect suggests that early similarity 
matches helped to bootstrap the discovery of the rela-
tional matches, and then faded in importance over suc-
cessive examples.  And fourth, familiar dimensions are 
introduced one at a time before the child is asked to 
make cross-dimensional mappings.  This procedure may 
help the child learn to focus attention on the relevant 
dimensions before requiring them to use those dimen-
sions as the basis of mapping.   
We used DORA to simulate Kotovsky and Gentner’s 
(1996) Experiment 2.  To create their stimuli, Kotovsky 
and Gentner crossed two relations (symmetry and mo-
notonic increase), with two dimensions (color and size), 
and two trial types (same-dimension and cross-dimen-
sion).  Each trial type consisted of a sample stimulus, 
which depicted a relation (either symmetry or monoton-
ic increase) that held over a particular dimension (either 
size or color), and two match stimuli, one of which de-
picted the same relation holding over either the same 
dimension or a different dimension.  This design yielded 
eight trial types (see Table 8).  Each child received 16 
trials, two of each type.   !
Table 8. 
Summary of the eight trial types used by Kotovsky and 
Gentner (1996).  Children received two of each trial type. 
!
To simulate each trial we placed a proposition repre-
senting the sample (P1) in the driver and a representa-
tion of two match items (P2 and P3) in the recipient. 
Each item was represented as three POs, one for each of 
the elements in a given item (e.g., one PO for each of 
the three circles in the sample item from Figure 11a). 
Each PO was attached to a unique RB.  All three RBs 
were attached to a single P unit.  This convention corre-
sponds to our assumption that the children understood 
that each item (the sample and each of the two matches) 
was a single item composed of three elements (see Fig-
ure 12).  Each PO was attached to 12 semantics:  One 
describing its role in the predictive relation indepen-
dently of the dimension over which the relation holds 
(e.g., “least”, “medium”, “most”), one describing its 
position in the array (i.e., “left”, “middle”, and “right”), 
two describing its shape (i.e., “circle1” and “circle2”, or 
“square1” and “square2”), two describing its value on 
the relevant dimension, one specific and one abstract 
(e.g., “size-5” and “size” or “color-black” and “color”), 
and six random semantics selected from a pool of 50. 
We presented the trials to DORA in the progressively 
aligned order described by Kotovsky and Gentner 
(1996).  Just like the children in Kotovsky and Gen-
tner’s experiment, DORA received two trials of each 
(a) (b)
Relation D i m e n s i o n o f 
sample
D i m e n s i o n o f 
match
Symmetry Size Size
Symmetry Color Color
M o n o t o n i c 
increase
Color Color
M o n o t o n i c 
increase
Size Size
Symmetry Size Color
Symmetry Color Size
M o n o t o n i c 
increase
Color Size
M o n o t o n i c 
increase
Size Color
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type for a total of eight same-dimensional trials in the 
following order: two symmetrical size trials, then two 
symmetrical color trials, then two monotonic increase in 
color trials, then two monotonic increase in size trials. 
Then DORA received eight cross-dimensional trials in 
the same order.   
On each trial DORA did the following.  First, it tried 
to map the sample item in driver to one of the two 
match items in the recipient.  If it mapped the sample to  
!  
Figure 12.  An illustration of DORA’s representation of a trial from Kotovsky and Gentner (1996), Experiment 2. !
one of the two match items, that item was DORA’s an-
swer on that trial.  Otherwise, it picked one of the two 
match items at random.  After DORA selected one of 
the two match items, it compared that match item to the 
sample item and learned new POs via its predicate dis-
covery algorithm.  This procedure resulted in three new 
POs, one for each mapped object in the match item (see 
Figure 12).  On pairs of successive trials DORA refined 
the new POs it had learned via its predicate refinement 
algorithm (i.e., it compared and refined the new POs it 
learned on the first and second trials, on the third and 
fourth trials, on the fifth and sixth trials, and on the sev-
enth and eighth trials).  Thus, if DORA made correct 
choices it on the first four trials it learned refined repre-
sentations of the symmetry relation (i.e., the new POs it 
learned were connected most strongly to the semantics 
describing symmetry), and if it made correct choices on 
the second four trials it learned refined representations 
of the monotonic increase relation (i.e., the new POs it 
learned were connected most strongly to the semantics 
describing monotonic increase).  If DORA made incor-
rect choices it learned representations connected to a 
random set of features (those shared by the sample item 
and the incorrect match item).   
In Kotovsky and Gentner’s experiment, the same 
sample items were used for the same- and cross-dimen-
sion trials.  That is, the triads used in the sample during 
the first 8 trials (the same-dimension trials) were used 
again in the sample for the second eight trials (the cross-
dimension trials).  Therefore, we allowed DORA to use 
the representations it had learned during the first 8 trials 
(the same-dimension trials) when it performed the sec-
ond 8 trials (i.e., the cross-dimension trials).  For each 
cross-dimension symmetry trial we chose (at random) 
one of the sets of refined POs DORA had learned during 
previous same-dimension symmetry trials, and placed 
that representation into the driver.  Similarly, for cross-
dimensional monotonic increase trial we chose (at ran-
dom) one of the two sets of refined POs DORA had 
learned during the earlier same-dimensional monotonic 
increase trials, and placed that representation into the 
driver.  This procedure reflects the assumption that the 
children in Kotovsky and Gentner’s experiment used 
what they learned during the earlier trials to represent 
subsequent trials and to make their responses.  As be-
fore, on each trial DORA attempted to map the driver 
propostion onto the recipient items.  The item in the 
recipient that most strongly mapped to the sample item 
in the driver was taken as DORA’s response.  
We ran 200 simulations with 16 trials per simulation 
(each simulation corresponds to a single subject from 
Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996).  In Kotovsky and Gen-
tner’s study children were separated into two pseudo-
groups for the purposes of analysis.  Children who per-
formed above chance on the first 8 trials were placed in 
the “performed well initially” (PWI) group, and those 
who performed at chance were placed in the “performed 
poorly initially” (PPI) group.  Following Kotovsky and 
Gentner we grouped each simulation into one of these 
two pseudo-groups.  If, on a given simulation, DORA 
performed well on the first 8 trials (i.e., it got 6 or more 
correct) it was placed in the PWI group, otherwise, it 
was placed in the PPI group.  DORA’s performance on 
the later 8 trials for the PWI and PPI groups, and the 
DRIVER
RECIPIENT
Sample item
Match item 1 Match item 2
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human data for the children in the PWI and PPI groups 
from Kotovsky and Genter, Experiment 2 are summa-
rized in Figure 13.  Like the children in Kotovsky and 
Gentner’s study, early success with progressively 
aligned stimuli yielded later success on cross-dimen-
sional matches and early failure on these trials led to 
performance near chance on the later trials.  Important-
ly, like the children in Kotovsky and Gentner’s experi-
ment, DORA could discover the relevant relational cat-
egories incidentally, without any explicit feedback. 
!
Figure 13.  Simulation data of Kotovsky and Gentner 
(1996). !
Comparison and adult relation learning 
Comparison plays a central role in the formation of 
adults’ relational concepts (Phenomenon 16; see e.g., 
Dixon & Bangart, 2004; Doumas & Hummel, 2004b; 
Kurtz & Bourkina, 2004).  An experiment by Dixon and 
Bangart (2004) demonstrated how comparison facili-
tates adults’ learning of relational concepts—specifical-
ly, the relation between parity (i.e., odd or even number) 
and the behavior of chains or circuits of gears.  Dixon 
and Bangart had adults solve a series of gear problems. 
In each problem the subject was shown a set of gears 
(see Figure 14).  Each gear set was either single-path-
way (i.e., a set of gears arranged to form a  
line so there is a single pathway between any two gears; 
Figure 14a) or two-pathway (i.e., a set of gears arranged 
to form a closed circuit so there are two pathways be-
tween any two gears; Figure 14b).  On each trial the 
subject was shown a source gear that always spun 
clockwise.  The subject’s task was to determine which 
direction a target gear would spin, and, in the case of 
two-path sets, whether it would jam.  The parity of the 
number of gears (i.e., whether the number was odd or 
even) separating the source and the target gears governs 
the direction in which the target gear will spin.  If there 
is an odd number of gears between the source and tar-
get, then the target will turn the same direction as the 
source.  In addition, for two-pathway problems, if there 
is an even number of gears overall (or, equivalently, if 
the two paths from the source to the target have the 
same parity), then the set will not jam.  But if there is an 
odd number of gears (or the two paths have unequal 
parity) then it will jam.  
The goal of this study was to determine the condi-
tions that lead subjects to discover the relationship be-
tween parity and (a) the direction of the target gear and 
(b) whether a circuit will jam.  Dixon and Bangart 
(2004) hypothesized that two-pathway trials with the 
same parity but different numbers of gears in each 
pathway (e.g., one pathway with 2 gears, the other with 
4) would provide subjects with the most opportunity to 
extract the parity rule because these trials provided the 
subject with the opportunity to compare two pathways 
(both were present in front of the subject simultaneous-
ly) and thus notice what they had in common (i.e., pari-
ty).  Therefore, repeatedly solving two-pathway prob-
lems with the same parity but different numbers of gears 
should increase the likelihood of the subject discovering 
the parity rule.  Consistent with this prediction, the au-
thors found that the probability of discovering the parity 
rule increased with each consecutive two-pathway same 
parity trial the subject encountered.   
We used DORA to simulate the findings of Dixon 
and Bangart (2004).  On each trial there were a number 
of features that the subject could have noticed about one 
or both pathways.  We assumed that on each trial the 
subject attended to some subset of the possible features 
of each pathway and based their comparison of the two 
pathways on this feature set.  For each two-pathway 
trial, DORA, like Dixon and Bangart’s subjects, “saw” 
two pathways.  We placed a representation of one path-
way in the driver and a representation of the other path-
way in the recipient.  Each pathway was represented as 
a PO unit attached to 10 semantic features.  The seman-
tic features were selected randomly from a pool of 400. 
To simulate same-parity trials, the pools of seman-
tics used to build both pathway representations con-
tained either the semantic “parity-even” or the semantic 
“parity-odd”.  To simulate the different-parity trials, the 
pools of semantics used to build one of the pathway 
representations contained the “parity-even” semantic, 
and the other pool contained the “parity-odd” semantic. 
On each trial DORA compared the representation of the 
pathway in the driver to the representation of the path-
way in the recipient and predicated their common prop-
erties via its comparison-based predication routine.  
Each simulation consisted of five trials.  Of these, 
between one and five were two-pathway same-parity 
trials, and the remainder were two-pathway different-
parity trials.  This resulted in five types of simulations 
(i.e., one same-parity and four different-parity trials; 
two same-parity and three different-parity trials, etc., up 
to five same-parity and zero different-parity trials).  We 
ran 1000 simulations of each type.  On each simulation, 
we measured the probability that DORA would build an 
explicit predicate representing parity (i.e., a new PO 
connected most strongly to either “parity-odd” or “pari-
ty-even”).  The results are presented in Figure 15.  Like 
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the subjects in Dixon and Bangart’s experiment, the probability that DORA discovered the parity rule  
!  
Figure 14.  Examples of the stimuli used in Dixon and Bangart (2004).  (a) A one-pathway gear set.  (b) Two-pathway gear 
sets.  The gear set on the left has an even number of gears and will not jam.  The gear set on the right has an odd number of 
gears and will jam.  Each set has a driving gear (marked by the black center circle that turns clockwise).  The subject's task is 
to identify what direction the target gear (marked by a center triangle) will turn, and for two-pathway gears whether or not the 
gear set will jam. !!
!  
Figure 15. Simulation of Dixon and Bangart’s (2004) data. !!
increased with the number of same-parity trials in the 
set: Like the human subjects, the greater the number of 
useful comparisons DORA could make, the more likely 
it was to extract the rule.  
In addition, these simulations along with the “per-
ception” and “interleaved” simulations described under 
Learning relational concepts from examples demon-
strate that DORA provides a natural account of learning 
relations in both naturalistic and experimental settings. 
In naturalistic settings children and adults take longer to 
master relational concepts (e.g., taking a year to learn a 
refined concept of bigger-than); by contrast when chil-
dren and adults learn from blocked examples, they learn 
relational concepts much more quickly (e.g., learning a 
concept like monotonic-increase in a single experimen-
tal session).  When DORA learns new relational con-
cepts from interleaved examples, it learns comparatively 
slowly.  However, when it learns new relational con-
cepts from blocked training (as in the simulations of 
Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996, and Dixon & Bangart, 
2004) it learns more quickly.  Thus, DORA accounts for 
both the slower naturalistic learning of children and the 
faster blocked learning of children and adults.  !
General Discussion	

Summary and Overview 
The question of how people acquire relational con-
cepts is important because the relations a person can 
predicate tightly constrain the kinds of thoughts that 
person can have and the kinds of problems they can 
solve. Little is known, however, about how people ac-
quire relational concepts.  Accordingly, the question of 
how—or indeed, whether—people could learn struc-
tured (i.e., relational) representations from examples has 
been cited as a fundamental limitation of relational ac-
counts of cognition (e.g., Munakata & O’Reilly, 2003; 
O’Reilly & Busby, 2002; O’Reilly, Busby, & Soto, 
2003).  We have presented a theory of how structure-
sensitive and semantically-rich representations of rela-
tions are discovered and predicated from unstructured 
(a)  One-pathway (b)  Two-pathway
.008
0 1
Humans
DORA
0.01
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
D
is
co
v
er
in
g
P
ar
it
y
 R
u
le
2
Number of prior same-parity trials
3 4
0.02
0.03
.006
.009
.011
.012
.018 .017
.021
.023
.026
A theory of the discovery and predication of relational concepts !33
(holistic) examples. This theory rests on a few key 
tenets.  First, adopting a role-filler binding representa-
tional system reduces the problem of discovering rela-
tions to the problem of discovering single-place predi-
cates (object properties or relational roles) and linking 
these together to form multi-place relational structures. 
Second, predicates and their arguments share a common 
representational basis (i.e., a common vocabulary of 
semantic primitives).  Third, comparison can lead to the 
discovery, predication and gradual refinement of invari-
ant properties, and the formation of multi-place rela-
tional structures.  And fourth, mapping multiple predi-
cates of smaller arity can lead to the predication of 
higher-arity structures. 
We have instantiated the theory in a computer simu-
lation, DORA (Discovery Of Relations by Analogy). 
DORA, like its predecessor, LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 
1997, 2003), is a symbolic-connectionist model—a sys-
tem built from traditional connectionist computing ele-
ments that, by virtue of its distributed representations 
and its solution to the dynamic binding problem, repre-
sents relational knowledge in a way that is simultane-
ously semantically rich and meaningfully symbolic (i.e., 
structure sensitive).   
Starting with unstructured (holistic) representations 
of objects, DORA learns structured and semantically 
rich representations of relational concepts.  As such, 
DORA serves as an existence proof that relational repre-
sentations can be learned from examples, thereby ad-
dressing one of the fundamental problems facing sym-
bolic models of cognition.  More importantly, DORA 
provides an integrated theory of the origins of complex 
mental representations and the discovery of structured 
representations of relational concepts.  Although many 
researchers have hypothesized that comparison may 
play a vital role in learning new representations (e.g., 
Doumas & Hummel, 2004b; Gentner, 2003; Gentner & 
Medina, 1998; Sandhofer & Smith, 2001; Smith, 1989; 
Yamauchi & Markman, 1998, 2000), DORA is the first 
detailed, computationally instantiated account of how 
comparison can serve to bootstrap the discovery and 
predication of structured relational concepts.   
We have shown that DORA accounts for a number 
of key phenomena in human cognitive development and 
relation discovery.  Specifically, we used DORA to sim-
ulate the discovery of relational representations that 
support analogical thinking (i.e., representations that are 
both structure sensitive and semantically rich), children 
and adult’s learning of dimensions and relational repre-
sentations, and the role of comparison and progressive 
alignment in children’s and adults’ relation learning. In 
so doing, we have demonstrated how a system can ex-
ploit the tools of statistical learning to discover repre-
sentations that allow the system to overcome the limita-
tions of statistical learning.   !
Developmental Mechanism	

In terms of developmental mechanism our general 
proposal is that the same psychological mechanisms that 
underlie analogical inference and schema induction—
namely, analogical mapping, self-supervised learning 
and intersection discovery—also underlie the discovery 
and predication of the object properties (such as size) 
and relations (such as bigger-than) that make analogical 
reasoning possible in the first place.  Armed with a basic 
vocabulary of perceptual and relational invariants 
(which may either be present at birth, the result of spe-
cific computing modules, or some combination of both), 
DORA discovers relations through general learning pro-
cesses, and develops as a result of experience.  Its de-
velopment reflects a cascading process in which, 
through learning, initially holistic features become rep-
resented as explicit predicates, which then become more 
refined and get combined into relations, which them-
selves become more refined.  The resulting qualitative 
changes in the model’s representations—and thus in its 
ability to reason—reflect the operation of basic learning 
processes generating more sophisticated representations 
by building on previously acquired representations. 
The model assumes that memory and perception are 
present at the start of learning.  It also requires a capaci-
ty for comparison, mapping and self-supervised learn-
ing, as well as the ability to flexibly treat a feature either 
as a (holistic) feature of an object or as a feature of an 
explicit predicate.  These same domain general process-
es are also implicated in discovering non-relational cat-
egories (i.e., properties, objects and perhaps and action 
categories).  Importantly, the developmental changes 
that occur in DORA are not driven by changes in archi-
tecture (although depending on the ages being modeled 
changes in memory and/or perception might be appro-
priate).  Rather, developmental change is a product of 
the experiences the learner has in the world. Specifically 
as a learner has more opportunities to compare things, 
she becomes less bound to the immediate situation and 
better able to extract context-independent relations. Our 
simulations demonstrate that this approach provides a 
powerful account of many phenomena both in cognitive 
development and in relational learning in adulthood. 
Although we by no means deny the importance of matu-
ration in cognitive development (see, e.g., Halford, 
1993; Halford et al., 1998), DORA provides an illustra-
tion of how far it is possible to go with learning alone.   !
Relation to Other Theories	

Our theoretical proposal is broadly consistent with 
those of Gentner and colleagues (e.g., Gentner & Rat-
termann, 1991; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998) and of 
Goswami (1992, 2001).  Like Gentner and colleagues, 
we argue that changes in knowledge and representation 
underlie changes in children’s relational thinking.  As 
children learn to represent the relations that characterize 
specific domains, their thinking becomes more relation-
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al in these domains.  Like Goswami we argue that anal-
ogy is a tool that drives knowledge acquisition in chil-
dren.  In DORA comparison (of which analogical map-
ping is a major component) is the process that drives 
learning novel relational concepts.  Perhaps the most 
important difference between our account and those of 
Gentner and Goswami is that ours is specified in much 
greater algorithmic detail.  Our account therefore more 
explicitly links the cognitive operations underlying rep-
resentational change during development with those that 
later exploit those changes (e.g., in the service of analo-
gy, reasoning, etc.).  Our account also arguably makes 
more detailed predictions about the nature and course of 
representational change in cognitive development.  In 
starker contrast to Goswami, we argue that early in de-
velopment object similarity, without regard to relational 
similarity, drives analogy and the discovery of relational 
concepts.  Goswami, in contrast, argues that relational 
and object-based (featural) responding compete, and 
thus must both be in place, from the very beginning.  
Our proposal is largely orthogonal to Halford’s rela-
tional complexity theory (Halford, 1993; Halford et al., 
1998).  Relational complexity theory is concerned pri-
marily with the formal complexity of reasoning prob-
lems (i.e., in terms of the number of role bindings that 
must be considered simultaneously in order to solve a 
problem) and with the implications of complexity for 
children’s ability to solve various problems as a function 
of maturational changes in their WM capacity (i.e., the 
number of role bindings they can hold in WM simulta-
neously).  For example, tasks that require representing 
binary relations (two role-bindings), such as chases 
(John, Mary), place fewer demands on WM—and 
should therefore be easier—than tasks that require 
ternary relations (three role bindings), such as gives 
(John, Mary, book).  According to relational complexity 
theory, as children mature, their WM capacity increases, 
allowing them to represent, and thus reason about, more 
complex relations.  However, relational complexity the-
ory does not speak to the question of where these rela-
tions come from in the first place.  The DORA model, as 
presented here, is silent on the question of whether WM 
capacity changes during development.  (However, it is 
worth noting that Hummel and Holyoak, 1997, demon-
strated that it is possible to simulate the developmental 
changes reported by Halford & Wilson, 1980, Experi-
ment 1, by manipulating LISA’s WM capacity.)  Rather, 
the focus of the present work is the manner in which 
comparison promotes the kinds of representational 
changes that take place during cognitive development. 
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that, as 
argued by Halford and colleagues, the complexity of the 
relational concepts that can be learned by experience 
(e.g., as in DORA), will necessarily be sharply con-
strained by the learner’s WM capacity.   !
Implications of binding by asynchrony of firing 
DORA’s ability to discover relational concepts from 
unstructured examples stems from two more basic abili-
ties—both of which derive from its use of systematic 
asynchrony of firing to represent role-filler bindings. 
The first is its ability to represent objects, attributes and 
relational roles using a single pool of semantic features, 
and simultaneously specify which features are acting as 
roles and which as fillers at any given time.  This ability 
makes it possible for DORA to learn explicit predicates 
from examples of objects (e.g., to transition from “red” 
as an implicit object feature to “red (x)” as an explicit 
predicate).  The second is DORA’s ability to exploit the 
temporal regularity of temporal binding to link role-
filler pairs into complete relations (e.g., to transition 
from more+size (x) and less+size (y) to bigger-than (x, 
y)). 
Hummel and Holyoak’s (1997, 2003a) LISA model 
demonstrated that, with the right architecture and 
knowledge representation, a connectionist system that 
can perform dynamic binding can account for a wide 
range of phenomena in relational reasoning (see Hum-
mel & Holyoak, 2003, for a thorough review).  DORA 
is a generalization and extension of LISA that represents 
role-filler bindings, not by role-filler synchrony of firing 
(as in LISA), but by role-filler asynchrony.  If level-of-
asynchrony (i.e., at the level of role-filler bindings, as in 
LISA, or the level of individual roles and fillers, as in 
DORA) is assumed to be a function of attentional focus, 
then DORA takes LISA as a special case: With attention 
directed to role-filler bindings (i.e., so that separate RBs 
fire out of synchrony with one another, but within RBs, 
roles fire in synchrony with their fillers), DORA be-
comes LISA.  (Although we have not discussed these 
simulations here, we have used DORA to simulate the 
same phenomena in analogical reasoning and schema 
induction for which LISA was designed.)  And with 
attention directed to the level of individual roles and 
fillers, as in the simulations reported here, DORA be-
comes a model of relational learning and cognitive de-
velopment.   
This distinction between role-filler synchrony vs. 
role-filler asynchrony as a function of attention makes a 
broad class of predictions that, to our knowledge, re-
main untested.  Although DORA’s use of role-filler 
asynchrony has the advantage that it makes it possible 
to use a common pool of features to represent both ob-
jects and relational roles—and thus makes relations 
learnable from examples—it has the disadvantage that it 
effectively cuts WM capacity in half, relative to role-
filler synchrony.  If WM contains roughly four or five 
“slots” (see, e.g., Cowan, 2001), and if role-filler bind-
ings are represented by role-filler synchrony (i.e., with 
each synchronized set of neurons occupying one “slot”), 
then the capacity of WM should be about four to five 
role-filler bindings (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003). 
However, if role-filler bindings are represented by role-
filler asynchrony (i.e., such that each role or filler must 
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occupy its own “slot” in WM), then the capacity of WM 
drops to two or two-and-a-half role bindings.   
Although LISA successfully simulates many cogni-
tive phenomena using role-filler synchrony, the theoreti-
cal considerations presented here suggest that learning 
relations from examples requires role-filler asynchrony. 
This divide between analogy and analogical inference 
on the one hand (the domain of LISA), and relation 
learning and relational concept acquisition on the other 
(the domain of DORA) suggests that some cognitive 
operations (such as relation learning) may require twice 
the WM resources of some others (such as analogy-
making).  This issue remains open for empirical investi-
gation, although, consistent with this general prediction, 
Saiki (2003) has demonstrated that when subjects have 
to update representations of multiple object properties 
(e.g., to detect color changes while tracking motion), 
visual WM capacity is reduced to 1-2 role-bindings (i.e., 
cut in half as predicted by DORA).  This result, in com-
bination with other findings suggesting the capacity of 
visual WM is closer to four or five (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 
1997), is strikingly consistent with DORA’s prediction 
that different tasks might impose different capacity de-
mands on WM.   
Finally, the fact that DORA uses a common repre-
sentational basis to represent both roles and fillers is 
broadly consistent with our ability to appreciate that a 
property is the same regardless of whether it is repre-
sented as a property of an object (as in red (ball)), or as 
an element of a more general class (as in color-of (ball, 
red)).  This ability is fundamentally beyond the reach of 
any model that requires objects (or object semantics) 
and predicates (or predicate semantics) to be fundamen-
tally different “data types”—namely, all other models of 
relational reasoning of which we are aware.  !
Additional Novel Predictions 
DORA makes several novel predictions, some of 
which we have noted previously.  Here we note a few 
additional predictions.   
Trajectory of Learning. DORA predicts that a child 
must learn the single place predicates/roles that com-
pose a relation prior to learning the relation.  This predi-
cate-then-relation trajectory should hold for all kinds of 
relations, both categorical relations over metric dimen-
sions, as emphasized in the simulations reported here, 
and more abstract relations such as chases, loves, and 
ameliorates.  In addition, children’s early role and rela-
tion representations should initially be “dirty” (context-
bound, and attached to many irrelevant features) and 
only later become more refined as a result of additional 
comparisons.  
Forming Relations.  Mapping role-filler sets should 
produce relations composed of those role-filler sets even 
if they are odd pairings.  That is, if DORA compares 
strange sets of predicates (e.g., it compares big (ball1) 
and light-colored (ball2) to big (block1) and light-col-
ored (block2)) and these sets of predicate-object pairs 
have sufficient over-lap, then it will form an odd rela-
tion composed of these single-place predicate sets (e.g., 
big-light-colored (ball1, ball2)).  This is a novel predic-
tion of the model that is consistent with prior work on 
relation learning (e.g., Sera & Smith, 1987; Smith & 
Sera, 1992), and which we are currently testing with 
children.  As elaborated below, this property of the 
model also suggests that there must be cognitive con-
straints on the conditions under which multiple roles 
will be placed into WM at the same time for the process 
of forming new relations. 
Confounded Features.  Because of the manner in 
which DORA learns relations, if two or more properties 
consistently covary with one another, then they should 
not be represented separately.  In other words, if, in 
DORA’s training corpus, a feature such as “shiny” al-
ways co-occurs with the feature “red”, then DORA will 
assume that all red things are shiny.  DORA’s represen-
tations will reflect the statistical structure of the particu-
lar instances experienced by an individual.  There is 
some developmental evidence in support of this predic-
tion (e.g., Sera & Smith, 1987; Smith & Sera, 1992).   !
Limitations and Open Problems 
Although we have demonstrated that DORA can 
simulate a number of empirical phenomena, especially 
in cognitive development, there remain many open 
problems for which the model does not provide an ac-
count.  We now consider some of the limitations of 
DORA and some open problems in the study of relation 
discovery.   !
Learning Different Kinds of Relations	

Most of the relations DORA learned in the simula-
tions reported here were relations with an underlying 
metric dimension (e.g., bigger-than).  In the case of a 
relation like bigger-than, the semantic content of the 
relational roles is intuitive: The larger role entails more 
of the dimension size and the smaller role entails less of 
that dimension.  In the case of a relation like chases, 
however, it is not just that one object is running in one 
direction and another object is running in the same di-
rection (multiple objects going the same direction hap-
pens in many circumstances, such as road races, flocks 
of birds, etc., that involve no chasing whatsoever). 
Rather, the object bound to the chased role is being 
chased precisely because the object bound to the chaser 
role is chasing it, and vice-versa: each role seems to 
somehow refer to the other.   
This property of chases seems, at first blush, to give 
it a qualitatively different character than a relation, such 
as bigger, defined over a metric dimension.  However, 
as noted previously, any multi-place relation is formally 
equivalent to a linked set of single-place predicates 
(Mints, 2001).  Thus, although chases seems qualitative-
ly different from bigger-than, formally speaking, they 
are not as different as they first appear.  The only neces-
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sary difference between such relations resides in the 
semantic features composing them.  Armed with the 
right set of semantic invariants, the routines DORA uses 
to learn bigger-than or same-color are equally able to 
learn a relation such as chase.  When a child chases a 
dog or a butterfly, she has the opportunity to compare 
these experiences and predicate what it “feels like” to be 
chaser.  The semantic features attached to the feeling are 
likely to include those of running and motion, but also 
excitement and a sense of pursuit.  In this way, the chas-
er role acquires semantic content.  Similarly, when she 
is chased a dog or her older sister, she will have the op-
portunity to compare those experiences with other expe-
riences of being chased and predicate their shared fea-
tures: again motion and excitement, but this time, a de-
sire to evade and escape.  And when she eventually 
compares sets of these experiences together, she has the 
opportunity to learn that chase is a two-role relation in 
which both objects are in motion, both experience ex-
citement, but one wishes to catch while the other wishes 
to escape.   
Importantly, DORA predicts that relations like chase 
and bigger-than should follow identical learning trajec-
tories.  Specifically, it predicts that a child should under-
stand what it is to be a chaser or a chased before she 
understands the full-blown chase relation.  Similarly, 
DORA predicts that the child might understand her feel-
ings toward her cat (i.e., that she loves the cat) and her 
parents’ feelings toward her (that she is loved by her 
parents) before she has the full-blown loves relation. 
There is already some developmental evidence that 
children do not learn whole relations from scratch, but 
rather learn individual roles and put them together to 
form whole relations  (e.g., Smith, 1984; Smith et al., 
1988), and that children comprehend relational roles 
before they comprehend the full relations to which these 
relations belong (Smith, 1984; Sera & Smith, 1987; 
Smith & Sera, 1992; Smith et al., 1988). 
The model, as it stands, does not speak to where the 
semantic invariants underlying chases or loves (or ame-
liorates) come from, but it does speak to the question of 
how they eventually become predicates that can take 
arguments—and can therefore eventually support com-
plex relational reasoning—and to the question of how 
and why these abilities develop as they do.  Our claim is 
that the human cognitive architecture, starting with 
whatever regularities it is given or can calculate from its 
environment as invariants, isolates those invariants in 
the objects and situations it is exposed to, and composes 
them into relational structures with which it describes 
and understands its world.  Given any set of such in-
variants (or a means to calculate them), DORA’s learn-
ing mechanisms can convert those invariants into the 
explicit predicates and relations that make relational 
reasoning possible.   !
Constraints on relation discovery	

As noted previously, left to run unchecked, DORA’s 
comparison and predication routines might generate a 
proliferation of predicates describing random object 
properties and relations.  In order to prevent this kind of 
run-away re-representation, there need to be constraints 
on when these learning routines are invoked.  At this 
point, we can only speculate on what these constraints 
might be, but the prior literature on concept acquisition 
and some general theoretical considerations can provide 
some guidance.   
The process of comparison (i.e., analogical map-
ping) figures centrally in all the operations DORA per-
forms.  DORA cannot learn from two situations if it 
does not, or cannot, align them.  As such, DORA pre-
dicts that any factors that promote explicit comparison 
and alignment should promote relation discovery and 
refinement, and any factors that reduce the likelihood of 
comparison or alignment should reduce the likelihood 
of relation discovery and refinement.  Certainly, explicit 
direction to compare two or more objects (e.g., by a 
parent or teacher) is likely to encourage comparison.   
A second factor that might encourage comparison is 
joint attention and, especially, language.  Gentner and 
her colleagues (e.g., Gentner, 2003; Gentner & Namy, 
1999; Gentner & Loewenstein, 2002; Gentner & Medi-
na, 1998; Gentner & Ratterman, 1991; Loewenstein & 
Gentner, in press; Namy & Gentner, 2002) have argued 
that relational language plays a key role in relational 
learning, helping us to detect and retain relational pat-
terns.   
There are at least four ways in which language may 
help to guide and constrain predication.  First, common 
labels may simply encourage comparison. Namy and 
Gentner (2002) found that providing common labels 
invites explicit comparison, while providing conflicting 
labels deters it.  Second, using common labels for simi-
lar relational concepts also increases the likelihood of 
retrieving one instance of a relational concept given 
another as a cue (e.g., Gentner, et al., 1993; Ross, 1989), 
thereby increasing the likelihood that they will be com-
pared.  Third, common labels seem to increase the per-
ceived similarity between instances (e.g., Sloutsky, 
2003; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; Sloutsky & Lo, 1999; 
Sloutsky, Lo, & Fisher, 2001; Sloutsky & Napolitano, 
2003; Smith, 2003), which might encourage compari-
son, alignment, and the formation of relational concepts. 
Finally, a common label can serve as an invariant prop-
erty across instances that are structurally similar but 
with little featural similarity.   
There are, no doubt, a number of constraints beyond 
those that we mention here.  In future work all of these 
open problems should be addressed more fully.  In the 
mean time, however, DORA provides a framework 
within which it is possible to discuss, at a detailed algo-
rithmic level, how these constraints might manifest 
themselves in the processes that enable the discovery of 
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relational representations from simple holistic begin-
nings.   
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Appendix A: Details of DORA’s Operation	
!
In DORA firing is organized into phase sets.  The 
phase set is the set of units in the driver that is currently 
active and firing out of synchrony with one another—i.e., it 
is the set of things DORA is currently “thinking about”.  A 
single phase set runs until each RB in the set has fired three 
times.  All the routines described below and in the text 
(e.g., retrieval, mapping, refinement, etc.) are allowed to 
run for one phase set.  The general sequence of events in 
DORA’s operation is outlined below.  The details of these 
steps, along with the relevant equations and parameter val-
ues, are provided in the subsections that follow.  Within 
reasonable ranges, DORA is very robust to the values of 
the parameters.  Throughout the equations in this Ap-
pendix, we will use the variable a to denote a unit’s activa-
tion, n its (net) input, and wij to denote the connection from 
unit j to unit i.   !
1. Bring a prop or a set of props into active memory in 
the driver, D, (as designated by the user). 
2. Initialize the activations of all units in the network to 
0. 
3. Select the firing order of propositions in D to be-
come active.  (In all the simulations described here, 
firing order is either set by the user or at random. 
However see Hummel & Holyoak, 2003, for a de-
tailed description of how a system like DORA can 
set its own firing order according to the constraints 
of pragmatic centrality and text coherence.) 
4. Run the phase set.  Repeat the following until each 
RB in D has fired three times: 
4.1. Select the proposition, P, in D that is currently at 
the head of the firing order. 
4.2. Select the RB, RBC, in P that is at the head of the 
firing order (chosen at random). 
4.3. Update the network in discrete time steps until the 
global inhibitor fires.  On each time step t do: 
4.3.1. Set input to RBC to 1. 
4.3.2. Update modes of all P units in R (the recipient 
set).  (Although we do not use higher-order 
relations in any of the simulations described in 
the text and therefore the mode of P units is 
always set to 1, we include this step for com-
pleteness) 
4.3.3. Update inputs to all token units in PS (i.e., all P, 
RB, and PO units in P). 
4.3.4. Update input to the PO inhibitors. 
4.3.5. Update input to the RB inhibitors. 
4.3.6. Update input to the local inhibitor. 
4.3.7. Update input to the global inhibitor. 
4.3.8. Update input to all semantic units. 
4.3.9. Update input to all token units in the recipient, 
R, and the emerging recipient, N.   
4.3.10. Update activations of all units in the network. 
4.3.11. Update all mapping hypotheses (if mapping is 
licensed).  
4.3.12. Run retrieval routine (if retrieval is licensed). 
4.3.13. Run comparison based learning (if learning is 
licensed). 
4.3.13.1. If learning from objects not already bound to 
predicates (i.e., if the RB that is currently most 
active is connected to only 1 PO) run compari-
son-based predication. 
4.3.13.2. Otherwise (i.e., if the active RB in D is con-
nected to two POs [an object and a role]) run 
refinement learning:   
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4.3.13.2.1. Run relation formation. 
4.3.13.2.2. Run predicate refinement.  
5. Update mapping connections. !
A complete analog (i.e., story, event, situation, etc.) is 
represented by the collection of token (P, RB and PO) units 
that together represent the propositions in that analog. 
Token units are not duplicated within an analog (e.g., with-
in an analog, each proposition that refers to Fido connects 
to the same “Fido” unit), but separate analogs have non-
overlapping sets of token units (e.g., Fido will be repre-
sented by one PO unit in one analog and by a different PO 
in another analog).  However, all analogs are connected to 
the same pool of semantic units.  The semantic units thus 
represent general types (e.g., dogs, large things, red things, 
etc.) and token units represent instantiations (i.e., tokens) 
of those things in specific analogs (Hummel & Holyoak, 
1997, 2003).  For example, if in some analog, the token 
(PO) unit “Fido” is connected to the semantics “animal”, 
“dog”, “furry” and “Fido”, then it is a token of an animal, a 
dog, a furry thing and of the particular dog Fido.   !
Step 4.3.2.  Update P unit modes for recipient P units 
P units in all propositions operate in one of three 
modes:  Parent, child, and neutral, as described by Hummel 
and Holyoak (1997, 2003).  Although the idea of units fir-
ing in “modes” sounds “non-neural”, Hummel, Burns & 
Holyoak (1994) describe how it can be accomplished with 
two or more auxiliary nodes with multiplicative synapses. 
A P unit in parent mode is operating as the overarching 
structure of a proposition.  Parent P units excite and are 
excited by RBs below them to which they are connected. 
In child mode, a P unit is acting as the argument of a high-
er-order proposition.  Child P units excite and are excited 
only by RBs to which they are upwardly connected.  In 
neutral mode, P units take input from all RBs to which they 
are upwardly connected.  The mode of P units in the driver 
are set at the beginning of each run by the rule given in the 
order of operations outline above.  Each P unit i in R up-
dates its mode, mi, according to: 
 ,            (A1) 
!
where RBabove is the summed input from all RB units to 
which i is upwardly connected (i.e., relative to which, i 
serves as an argument) and RBbelow is the summed input 
from all RB units to which it is downwardly connected. !
Steps 4.3.3.  Updating input to driver token units 
P units	

Each P unit, i, in D in parent mode updates its input as: 
                     (A2) 
where j are all RB units below P unit i to which i is con-
nected and k are all other P units in D that are currently in 
parent mode.  P units in D in child mode update their in-
puts by:   
        (A3) 
!
where j are RB units to which i is upwardly connected, k 
are other P units in the driver that are currently in child 
mode, l are all PO units in the driver that are not connected 
to the same RB as i, and m are all PO units that are con-
nected to the same RB (or RBs) as i.  When DORA is oper-
ating in binding-by-asynchrony mode, s = 1; when it is 
operating in binding-by-synchrony mode (i.e., like LISA), 
s = 0. !
RB units	

RB units in the driver update their inputs by: 
          (A4) 
where j are all P units in parent mode to which RB unit i is 
upwardly connected, k are all PO units connected to i, l are 
all other RB units in D, and Ii is the activation of the RB 
inhibitor yoked to i.   !
PO units	

PO units in the driver update their input by:
(A5) 
where j are all RB units to which PO unit i is connected, G 
is a gain parameter attached to the weight between the RB 
and its POs (POs learned via DORA’s comparison based 
predication algorithm have G=2 and 1 otherwise), k are P 
units in D that are currently in child mode and not connect-
ed to the same RB as i, l are all PO units in the driver that 
are not connected to the same RB as i, m are PO units that 
are connected to the same RB (or RBs) as i, and Ii is the 
activation of the PO inhibitor yoked to i.   !
Steps 4.3.4 and 4.3.5.  Update input to the RB and PO in-
hibitors 
Every RB and PO unit is yoked to an inhibitor.  Both 
RB and PO inhibitors integrate input over time as:   
                       (A6) 
where t refers to the current iteration, j is the RB or PO unit 
yoked to inhibitor unit i, and wij is the weight between RB 
or PO inhibitor i and its yoked RB or PO unit.  RB in-
hibitors are yoked only to their corresponding RB.  How-
ever, PO inhibitors are yoked both to their corresponding 
PO and all RB units in the same analog.  As a result, at any 
given instant, PO inhibitors receive twice as much input as 
RB inhibitors, and so reach their activation threshold twice 
as fast.  POs therefore oscillate twice as fast as RBs.  For 
the current instantiation of DORA the connection weight 
between all POs and RBs and their inhibitors is set to 1. 
The purpose of the PO and RB inhibitors is to establish the 
time-sharing that carries role-filler binding information and 
allows DORA to dynamically bind roles to fillers.  All PO 
and RB inhibitors become refreshed (ni = 0) when the 
global inhibitor (ΓG; described below) fires.   
mi =
Parent (1), RBabove < RBbelow
Child (−1) RBabove > RBbelow
Neutral(0) otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
ni = a j − 3ak
k
∑
j
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∑
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!
Steps 4.3.6 and 4.3.7.  Update the local and global in-
hibitors 
The local and global inhibitors, ΓL and ΓG respectively 
(see e.g., Horn and Usher, 1990; Horn et al., 1992; Usher 
and Nieber, 1996; von der Malsburg and Buhman, 1992), 
serve to coordinate the activity of units in the driver and 
recipient sets.  The local inhibitor is inhibited to inactivity 
(ΓL = 0) by any PO in the driver with activation above ΘL 
(= 0.5), and becomes active (ΓL = 10) when no PO in the 
driver has an activity above ΘL.  During asynchronous 
binding, the predicate and object POs time-share.  There is 
a period during the firing of each role-filler pair after the 
one PO fires and before the other PO becomes active when 
no PO in the driver is very active.  During this time the 
local inhibitor becomes active, inhibiting all PO units in 
the recipient to inactivity.  Effectively, ΓL serves as a local 
refresh signal, punctuating the change from predicate to 
object or object to predicate firing in the driver, and allow-
ing the units in the recipient to keep pace with units in the 
driver.   
The global inhibitor works similarly.  It is inhibited to 
inactivity (ΓG = 0) by any RB in the driver with activation 
above ΘG (= 0.5), and becomes active (ΓG = 10) when no 
RB in the driver is active above threshold.  During the 
transition between RBs in the driver there is a brief period 
when no driver RB are active above ΘG.  During this time 
ΓG inhibits all units in the recipient to inactivity, allowing 
units in the recipient to keep pace with those in the driver.   !
Step 4.3.8.  Update input to semantic units 
The input to semantic unit i is: 
                     (A7) 
!
where j is a PO unit in the driver or recipient.   !
Step 4.3.9.  Updating input to recipient token units 
Input to all token units in the recipient and emergent 
recipient are not updated for the first 5 iterations after the 
global or local inhibitor fires.  This is done in order to al-
low units in the recipient and emergent recipient to respond 
to the pattern of activation imposed on the semantic units 
by the driver PO unit that wins the competition to become 
active after an inhibitor fires. !
P units	

P units in parent mode in the recipient update their in-
puts by: 
                (A8) 
where j are all RB units to which P unit i is downwardly 
connected, k are all other P units in the recipient currently 
in parent mode and Mi is the mapping input to i: 
  
(A9) 
where j are token units of the same type as i in the driver 
(e.g., if i is a RB unit, j is all RB units in the driver), 
Max(Map(i)) is the highest of all unit i’s mapping connec-
tions, and Max(Map(j)) is the highest of all unit j’s map-
ping connections.  When a token unit in the driver fires, it 
excites all units to which it maps, and inhibits all units of 
the same type to which it does not map. 
P units in child mode in the recipient update their in-
puts by: 
  
(A10) 
where j are all RB units to which i is upwardly connected, 
Mi is the mapping input to i, k are all other P units in the 
recipient currently in child mode, l are POs in the recipient 
that are not connected to the same RB (or RBs if i is con-
nected to multiple RBs) as i, and m are PO units connected 
to the same RB (or RBs) as i.   !
RB units	

RB units in the recipient update their input by: 
  (A11) 
where j are P units currently in parent to which RB unit i is 
upwardly connected, k are P units currently in child mode 
to which i is downwardly connected, l are PO units to 
which unit i is connected, Mi is the mapping input to i, and 
m are other RB units in the recipient. !
PO units	

PO units in the recipient update their input by: !
  (A12) !
where j is RB units to which PO unit i is connected, SEMi 
is the semantic input to unit i, Mi is the mapping input to 
unit i, k is all PO units in the recipient that are not connect-
ed to the same RB (or RBs if unit i is connected to multiple 
RBs) as i, l is all other P units in the recipient currently in 
child mode that are not connected to the same RB (or RBs) 
as i, m is PO units connected to the same RB (or RBs) as i, 
and n is RB units in the recipient to which unit i is not con-
nected (input from j is only included on phase sets beyond 
the first).  SEMi , the semantic input to i, is calculated as:	

                        (A13) 
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where j are semantic units, wij is the weight between se-
mantic unit j and PO unit i, and num(j) is the total number 
of semantic units i is connected to with a weight above θ 
(=0.1).  Semantic input to POs is normalized by a Weber 
fraction so that the PO unit that best matches the current 
pattern of semantic activation takes the most semantic in-
put, and semantic input is not biased by the raw number of 
semantic features that any given PO is connected to (see 
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003; Marshall, 1995).   !
Step 4.3.10.  Update activations of all units in the network 
All token units in DORA update their activation by the 
simple leaky integrator function detailed in Eq. 1 in the 
main text.  The value of the growth parameter, γ, is 0.3, and 
the value of the decay parameter, δ, is 0.1.  Semantic units 
do not inhibit one-another the way that token units do. 
However, in order to keep their activations bounded, their 
activations are divisively normalized: The activation of a 
semantic unit is equal to its input divided by the maximum 
input to any semantic unit (see Eq. 3 in the main test). 
There is physiological evidence for divisive normalization 
in the feline visual system (e.g., Albrecht & Geisler, 1991; 
Bonds, 1989; Heeger, 1992) and psychophysical evidence 
for divisive normalization in human vision (e.g., Foley, 
1994; Thomas & Olzak, 1997).   
RB and PO inhibitors, i, update their activations ac-
cording to a simple threshold function: 
                       (A14) 
where  ΘIN = 220. !
Step 4.3.11.  Run update mapping hypotheses 
 The mapping algorithm used by DORA is adopted 
from Hummel and Holyoak (1997, 2003).  During the 
phase set DORA learns mapping hypotheses between all 
token units in the driver and token units of the same type in 
the recipient (i.e., between P units, between RB units and 
between PO units in the same mode [described below]). 
All mapping hypotheses are initialized to zero at the begin-
ning of a phase set.  The mapping hypothesis between an 
active driver unit and a recipient unit of the same type is 
updated by Eq. 4 in the main text (i.e., by a simple Hebbian 
learning rule).   
Step 4.3.12  Run retrieval 
DORA uses a variant of the retrieval routine described 
by Hummel and Holyoak (1997).  During retrieval proposi-
tions in the driver fire as described above for one phase set. 
Units in the dormant/LTM set become active in response to 
the patterns of activation imposed on the semantics by ac-
tive driver POs.  After all RBs in the driver have fired 
once, DORA retrieves propositions from LTM probabilisti-
cally using the Luce choice axiom:   
                            (A15) 
where Li is the probability that P unit i will be retrieved 
into working memory, Ri is the maximum activation P unit 
i reached while during the retrieval phase set and j are all 
other P units in LTM.  If a P unit is retrieved from LTM, 
the entire structure of tokens (i.e., RBs, POs, and P units 
that serve as arguments of the retrieved P unit) are re-
trieved into working memory.   !
Step 4.3.13.  Run learning routines 
In the current version of the model, learning is licensed 
whenever 70% of the driver token units map to recipient 
items (this 70% criterion is arbitrary, and in practice 100% 
of the units nearly always map; see the main text for a dis-
cussion of the limiting constraints on DORA’s learning 
routines).  If learning is licensed DORA invokes either its 
comparison-based-predication routine or its refinement 
learning routine.  Comparison based predication is licensed 
when the driver contains single objects, not yet bound to 
any predicates (i.e., each RB in the driver is bound only to 
a single PO.  Otherwise, DORA licenses refinement learn-
ing.   !
Step 4.3.13.1.  Comparison-based predication	

As detailed in the text, during comparison-based predi-
cation (CBP) for each PO in the driver that is currently 
active, and maps to a unit in the recipient with a mapping 
connection above the threshold ΘMAP (=0.5), DORA infers 
an empty PO unit (i.e., a PO connected to no semantic fea-
tures) in the recipient.  The mode of the existing PO units 
in both the driver and recipient is set to 0 and the mode of 
the newly inferred PO is set to 1.  While the mode of PO 
units is not important for the simulations described in the 
main text, it is important for assuring mappings from pred-
icates to other predicates and from objects and other ob-
jects when DORA using synchronous binding (as when it is 
behaving like LISA).  We mention it here and implement it 
in our code for the purposes of completeness.  DORA 
learns connections between the new PO and all active se-
mantics by the Eq. 6 in the main text.  During CBP, DORA 
also infers a new RB unit in the recipient.  The activation 
of each inferred unit is set to 1, and remains at 1 until ΓG or 
ΓL fires.  DORA learns a connection with a weight of 1 
between corresponding active token units (i.e., between P 
and RB units. and between RB and PO units) that are not 
already connected.   
Step 4.3.13.2.  Refinement Learning	

During refinement learning DORA first runs its relation 
formation routine then its predicate refinement routine.   
Step 4.3.13.2.1. When DORA successfully 
maps sets of role-filler bindings in the driver to sets of role-
filler bindings in the recipient, the resulting pattern of fir-
ing on the recipient RB units is exactly like what would 
emerge from RB units joined by a common P unit (i.e., the 
RBs fire out of synchrony but in close temporal proximity, 
and within each RB, the POs fire out of synchrony but in 
close temporal proximity; as detailed in the main text). 
During relation formation DORA exploits these temporal 
patterns to join the recipient RBs (along with their respec-
tive POs) into a new proposition—i.e., a new relation.  This 
process is accomplished as a case of SSL.  When an RB in 
the recipient becomes active, if no P units are active in the 
ai =
1, ni ≥ Θ IN
0, otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
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recipient, then a P unit is recruited in the recipient via SSL. 
The P unit remains active (activation=1) until the end of 
the phase set and learns connections to active RBs: A con-
nection (weight=1) is formed between the new P and any 
active RB in the recipient (to which that P unit is not al-
ready connected).  When the phase set ends, connection 
weights between the new P and any RBs to which it has 
connections are updated by the equation: 
                   (A16) 
where wij is the connection weight between P unit i and RB 
unit j, and wik is the connection weight between P unit i, 
and RB unit k where k is all RB units in the recipient.  Es-
sentially, if the new P has at least two connections to RB 
units (and the sum over k of wik is therefore ≥ 2), then 
DORA retains the connection weights between the recruit-
ed P and all RBs to which it has connections; if the sum is 
less than two, then it discards the connection (along with 
the P unit).  This convention ensures that DORA does not 
learn P units that connect only to a single RB.   
Step 4.3.13.2.2. As detailed in the text, during 
predicate refinement DORA learns a refined representation 
of mapped propositions or role-filler sets.  For each PO in 
the driver that is currently active, and maps to a unit in the 
recipient with a mapping connection above the threshold 
ΘMAP (=0.5), DORA infers an empty PO unit (i.e., a PO 
connected to no semantic features) in the emerging recipi-
ent.  DORA learns connections between the new PO and all 
active semantics by Eq. 6 in the main text.  In addition, 
DORA licenses self-supervised learning (SSL).  During 
SSL, DORA infers token units in the emerging recipient to 
match active tokens in D (the driver).  DORA will infer a 
structure unit in the emerging recipient in response to any 
unmapped structure unit in D.  Specifically, as detailed in 
the text, if unit j in D maps to nothing in the emerging re-
cipient, then when j fires, it will send a global inhibitory 
signal to all units in the emerging recipient.  This uniform 
inhibition, unaccompanied by any excitation, signals 
DORA to infer a unit of the same type (i.e., P, RB, PO) in 
the emerging recipient.  Inferred PO units in the emerging 
recipient have the same mode as the active PO in the dri-
ver.  The activation of each inferred unit in the emerging 
recipient is set to 1.  DORA learns connections (weight=1) 
between corresponding active tokens (i.e., between P and 
RB units. and between RB and PO units) in the emerging 
recipient.  To keep DORA’s representations manageable 
(and decrease the runtime of the simulations), at the end of 
the phase set, we discard any connections between seman-
tic units and POs whose weights are less than 0.1.   !
Step 5.  Update mapping connections 
At the end of every phase set mapping connections are 
updated.  First, all mapping hypotheses are normalized 
divisively: Each mapping hypothesis, hij between units j 
and i, is divided by the largest hypothesis involving either 
unit i or j.  Next it is normalized subtractively: The value of 
the largest hypothesis involving either i or j (not including 
hij itself) is subtracted from hij.  The divisive normalization 
keeps the mapping hypotheses bounded between zero and 
one, and the subtractive normalization implements the one-
to-one mapping constraint by forcing mapping hypotheses 
involving the same i or j to compete with one another (see 
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).  Finally, the mapping weights 
between each unit in the driver and the token units in the 
recipient of the same type are updated by the equation: !
                  (A17) 
where Δwij is the change in the mapping connection weight 
between driver unit i and recipient unit j and η is a growth 
parameter set to 0.9. Δwij is truncated for values below 0 
and above 1.   !!
Appendix B: Details of Simulations	
!
The details of the simulations reported in the main text are 
presented below.  In the descriptions of the simulations we use 
the following notation.  Propositions are labeled P# (e.g., P1 to 
denote the first proposition, P2 to denote the second, and so 
forth).  Propositions are listed in a form of propositional nota-
tion with the predicate term in italics and the arguments listed 
in the parentheses that follow (e.g., bigger (object1, object2) 
for the proposition object1 is bigger than object2).  For objects 
not bound to predicates we simply list the objects in parenthe-
ses without a predicate term in front of them.  The semantics 
of each role of a relation and each object are listed under the 
Semantics subheading of each simulation.  They are listed in 
the following form:  name-of-role-or-object (semantics-at-
tached-to-that-role-or-object).  Names of roles are in italics, 
names of objects are not.  For example, object1 (sem1, sem2, 
sem3) indicates that the object object1 is attached to the se-
mantics sem1, sem2, and sem3.   !
General relation discovery 
“Perception” simulation.  P1 – P160:  (object1) – (objec-
t160). 
Semantics:  All POs (object1 – object160) attached to 
“size” and one of the following (size-1, size-2, size-3, size-4, 
size-5, size-6, size-7, size-8, size-9, size-10), plus 10 addition-
al semantics (sem1 – sem150). 
“Memory” simulation: Learning a single relational con-
cept.  P1 – P50:  (object1) – (object50). 
Semantics:  All POs (object1 – object50) attached to 
“size” and one of the following (size-1, size-2, size-3, size-4, 
size-5, size-6, size-7, size-8, size-9, size-10), plus 10 addition-
al semantics (sem1 – sem500). 
“Memory” simulations:  Learning multiple relations from 
interleaved examples.  P1 – P100:  (object1) – (object100). 
Semantics:  All POs (object1 – object100) attached to one 
dimension at random.  Dimensions include “size” and one of 
the following (size-1, size-2, size-3, size-4, size-5, size-6, size-
7, size-8, size-9, size-10), “width” and one of the following 
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(width-1, width-2, width-3, width-4, width-5, width-6, 
width-7, width-8, width-9, width-10), “color” and one of the 
following (color-1, color-2, color-3, color-4, color-5, color-6, 
color-7, color-8, color-9, color-10), or “height” and one of the 
following (height-1, height-2, height-3, height-4, height-5, 
height-6, height-7, height-8, height-9, height-10).  Also at-
tached to each other dimension with a probability of .25.  In 
addition, connected to 10 semantics (sem1 – sem500). 
For “memory” simulations each simulation occurred as 
follows: First, randomly select an item from LTM.  Seventy-
five percent of the time that item is selected from the last 50 
items DORA has learned (in the single relational concept sim-
ulation) or from the last 100 items DORA has learned (in the 
interleaved examples simulation).  Twenty-five percent of the 
time that item is selected from the remainder of items in LTM. 
Second, place that item in the driver.  Third, run DORA’s nor-
mal order of operations.  First, run retrieval.  During retrieval, 
more recently learned items are more likely to be retrieved. 
For the single relational concept simulation for each 50 simu-
lations, the items learned during the previous 50 simulations 
and higher are weighted by .75 during retrieval, and all other 
items are weighted by .25.  For the interleaved examples simu-
lation for each 100 simulations, the items learned during the 
previous 100 simulations and higher are weighted by .75 dur-
ing retrieval, and all other items are weighted by .25.  If any-
thing is retrieved, run mapping.  If anything is mapped, run 
learning (comparison-based predication, relation formation, 
and refinement). 
Cross-mapping 
P1:  bigger (produced during general relation discovery 
simulation) (dog, cat). 
P2:  bigger (cat, dog). 
Semantics:  bigger-role:  (size, more); smaller-role (size, 
less); dog (dog1, dog2, dog3, dog4, dog5, dog6); cat (cat1, 
cat2, cat3, cat4, cat5, cat6). !
Non-identical predicate mapping	

P1: bigger (produced during general relation discovery 
simulation) (object1, object2). 
P2:  bigger (cat, dog). 
Semantics: P2-bigger-role (more, x); P2-smaller-role 
(less, y); object1 (object1.1 – object1.6); object2 (object2.1 – 
object2.6); dog (dog1, dog2, dog3, dog4, dog5, dog6); cat 
(cat1, cat2, cat3, cat4, cat5, cat6). !
N-ary restriction 
P1: bigger (produced during general relation discovery 
simulation) (object1, object2). 
P2:  bigger-role (object3). 
Semantics: P1-bigger-agent (more, x); P2-bigger-patent 
(less, y); object1 (object1.1 – object1.6); object2 (object2.1 – 
object2.6); object3 (object1.1 – object1.3, and object2.4 – 
object2.6). 
Smith, Rattermann, & Sera (1988) 
Simulation part 1.  P1 – P160:  (object1) – (object160). 
Semantics:  All POs (object1 – object160) attached to 
“height” and one of the following (height-1, height-2, 
height-3, height-4, height-5, height-6, height-7, height-8, 
height-9, height-10), plus 10 additional semantics (sem1 – 
sem150).  In addition, POs attached to height-1 – height-3 are 
also attached to (small), and POs attached to height-7 – height-
10 are also attached to (big).   
Simulation part 2.  Driver P1:  more+height (butterfly1, 
butterfly2).   
Semantics:  High trial:  more+height-role (more, height); 
less+height-role (less, height); butterfly1 (butterfly1 flies fly 
buzzes high); butterfly2 (butterflyfly2 flies fly pretty high). 
Low trial: mor+-height-role (more, height); less+height-
role (less, height); butterfly1 (butterfly1 flies fly buzzes low); 
butterfly2 (butterflyfly2 flies fly pretty low) 
Neutral trial: more+height-role (more, height); less-
height-role (less, height); butterfly1 (butterfly1 flies fly 
buzzes); butterfly2 (butterflyfly2 flies fly pretty) 
See text for details of propositions in LTM.   !
Smith (1984) 
Simulation part 1.  P1 – P160:  (object1) – (object160). 
Semantics:  All POs (object1 – object160) attached to 
“color” and one of the following (red, yellow, blue, white, 
black, green, orange, purple, grey, pink), plus 10 additional 
semantics (sem1 – sem150).   
Simulation part 2.  Driver:  Unbound objects: P1:  (ball1) 
Semantics:  ball1 (ball1, ball, round, red, sphere, bouncy, 
medium, size-5).   
Value-dependent relation:  P1:  same-color+red (ball1, 
ball2).   
Semantics:  same-color+red-1 (same, color, red, 1); same-
color+red-2 (same, color, red, 2); ball1 (ball1, ball, round, red, 
sphere, bouncy, medium, size-5); ball2 (ball2, ball, round, red, 
sphere, bouncy, small, size-2).   
 Value-independent relations:  P1:  same-color (ball1, 
ball2). 
Semantics:  same-color-1 (same, color, 1);  same-color-2 
(same, color, 2); ball1 (ball1, ball, round, red, sphere, bouncy, 
medium, size-5); ball2 (ball2, ball, round, red, sphere, bouncy, 
small, size-2). 
Recipient:  Various proposition created during simulation 
part 1.  To differentiate the roles of the same color relation, 
add semantic “1” to one of the roles and “2” to the other.  This 
serves simply to differentiate the two roles of the same-color 
relation for the purposes of mapping.  See text for additional 
details.   
Gentner & Namy (1999) 
Condition NC:  P1:  (apple). 
P2:  (ball). 
P3:  (banana). 
Semantics:  apple (round, fruit, + 6 semantics from seman-
tic sem1 – sem15); ball (round + sem1 – sem10); banana (fruit 
+ sem10 – sem15 + sem16 – sem20).   
Condition C: P1:  (apple). 
P2:  (watermelon). 
P3:  (orange). 
P4:  (grapes). 
P5:  (ball). 
P6:  (banana). 
Semantics: apple (round, fruit, + 6 semantics from seman-
tic sem1 – sem15); watermelon (round, fruit, + 5 semantics 
from semantic sem1 – sem15); orange (round, fruit, + 5 se-
mantics from semantic sem1 – sem15); grapes (round, fruit, + 
5 semantics from semantic sem1 – sem15); ball (round + sem1 
– sem10); banana (fruit + sem10 – sem15 + sem16 – sem20).   !
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Kotovsky & Gentner (1996) 
Symmetry trial size correct:  P1:  (object1, object2, objec-
t3).   
P2:  (object4, object5, object6).   
Semantics:  object1 (left-side, size, size-2, smallest, cir-
cle1, circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object2 (middle, 
size, size-5, biggest, circle1, circle2, + 4 random from sem1-
sem50); object3 (right-side, size, size-8, smallest, circle1, 
circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object4 (left-side, 
size, size-3, smallest, square1, squre2, + 4 random from sem1-
sem50); object5 (middle, size, size-6, biggest, square1, 
square2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object6 (right-side, 
size, size-9, smallest, black, square1, square2, + 4 random 
from sem1-sem50).   
Symmetry trial color correct:  P1:  (object1, object2, ob-
ject3).   
P2:  (object4, object5, object6).   
Semantics:  object1 (left-side, size, grey, lightest, circle1, 
circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object2 (middle, size, 
lightest, darkest, circle1, circle2, + 4 random from sem1-
sem50); object3 (right-side, size, lightest, lightest, circle1, 
circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object4 (left-side, 
size, black, lightest, square1, squre2, + 4 random from sem1-
sem50); object5 (middle, size, black, darkest, square1, 
square2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object6 (right-side, 
size, black, lightest, black, square1, square2, + 4 random from 
sem1-sem50).    
Monotonic-increase size trial correct: P1:  (object1, objec-
t2, object3).   
P2:  (object4, object5, object6).   
Semantics:  object1 (left-side, size, size-2, smallest, cir-
cle1, circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object2 (middle, 
size, size-5, medium-size, circle1, circle2, + 4 random from 
sem1-sem50); object3 (right-side, size, size-8, biggest, circle1, 
circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object4 (left-side, 
size, size-3, smallest, square1, squre2, + 4 random from sem1-
sem50); object5 (middle, size, size-6, medium-size, square1, 
square2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object6 (right-side, 
size, size-9, biggest, black, square1, square2, + 4 random from 
sem1-sem50).   
Monotonic-increase color trial correct: P1:  (object1, ob-
ject2, object3).   
P2:  (object4, object5, object6).   
Semantics:  object1 (left-side, size, grey, lightest, circle1, 
circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object2 (middle, size, 
lightest, medium-dark, circle1, circle2, + 4 random from 
sem1-sem50); object3 (right-side, size, lightest, darkest, cir-
cle1, circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object4 (left-
side, size, black, lightest, square1, squre2, + 4 random from 
sem1-sem50); object5 (middle, size, black, medium-dark, 
square1, square2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object6 
(right-side, size, black, darkest, black, square1, square2, + 4 
random from sem1-sem50).    
Symmetry trial size incorrect:  P1:  (object1, object2, ob-
ject3).   
P2:  (object4, object5, object6).   
Semantics:  object1 (left-side, size, size-2, smallest, cir-
cle1, circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object2 (middle, 
size, size-5, biggest, circle1, circle2, + 4 random from sem1-
sem50); object3 (right-side, size, size-8, smallest, circle1, 
circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object4 (left-side, 
size, size-3, smallest, square1, squre2, + 4 random from sem1-
sem50); object5 (middle, size, size-6, smallest, square1, 
square2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object6 (right-side, 
size, size-9, biggest, black, square1, square2, + 4 random from 
sem1-sem50).    
Symmetry trial color incorrect:  P1:  (object1, object2, 
object3).   
P2:  (object4, object5, object6).   
Semantics:  object1 (left-side, size, grey, lightest, circle1, 
circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object2 (middle, size, 
lightest, darkest, circle1, circle2, + 4 random from sem1-
sem50); object3 (right-side, size, lightest, lightest, circle1, 
circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object4 (left-side, 
size, black, darkest, square1, squre2, + 4 random from sem1-
sem50); object5 (middle, size, black, darkest, square1, 
square2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object6 (right-side, 
size, black, lightest, black, square1, square2, + 4 random from 
sem1-sem50).    
Monotonic-increase size trial incorrect: P1:  (object1, 
object2, object3).   
P2:  (object4, object5, object6).   
Semantics:  object1 (left-side, size, size-2, smallest, cir-
cle1, circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object2 (middle, 
size, size-5, medium-size, circle1, circle2, + 4 random from 
sem1-sem50); object3 (right-side, size, size-8, biggest, circle1, 
circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object4 (left-side, 
size, size-3, biggest, square1, squre2, + 4 random from sem1-
sem50); object5 (middle, size, size-6, smallest, square1, 
square2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object6 (right-side, 
size, size-9, medium-size, black, square1, square2, + 4 random 
from sem1-sem50).   
Monotonic-increase color trial incorrect: P1:  (object1, 
object2, object3).   
 P2:  (object4, object5, object6).   
Semantics:  object1 (left-side, size, grey, lightest, circle1, 
circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object2 (middle, size, 
lightest, medium-dark, circle1, circle2, + 4 random from 
sem1-sem50); object3 (right-side, size, lightest, darkest, cir-
cle1, circle2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object4 (left-
side, size, black, darkest, square1, squre2, + 4 random from 
sem1-sem50); object5 (middle, size, black, lightest, square1, 
square2, + 4 random from sem1-sem50); object6 (right-side, 
size, black, medium-dark, black, square1, square2, + 4 random 
from sem1-sem50).    
Dixon & Bangart (2004) 
P1:  (gear1). 
P2:  (gear2).   
Semantics:  gear1 (randomly pick 10 from a pool contain-
ing either parity-even or parity-odd and sem2-sem400); gear2 
(randomly pick 10 from a pool containing either parity-even or 
parity-odd and sem2-sem400).   
